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China TWO VIEWS AND A PROPOSAL

Visit to a Fourth of Mankind
KEITH BUCHANAN

The Enormous Revival Meeting
ROBERT S. ELEGANT

Between Goals and Dogma
I-KUA CHOU

. S. ELIOT As Critic & Playwright
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LETTERS

same script, same performance

New York City

DEAR SIRS: *The Nation* [Sept. 19], discussing the current disaffection of certain "intellectuals" from President Johnson, says editorially that "intellectuals are trained to compare script with performance; more perhaps than others they resent deception." In the same paragraph, however, *The Nation* also says that "Almost all of them voted for him in 1964, largely in response to his repeated assurances that he would not escalate the war in Vietnam."

The fact is that President Johnson *did* escalate the war, right in the middle of the campaign, by ordering the bombing of ports and oil installations in North Vietnam. . . . The "intellectuals" today justify their own political shortcomings by charging that the President changed his policy after the election. But the President did not change either his policy or his script. Then as now his policy was escalation; his script was peace.

If the "intellectuals" wish to help the electorate to distinguish divergencies of official script from performance, they will have to begin by facing the fact that so far their record does not inspire confidence.

Helen Mears

Chicago theatre

Morton Grove, Ill.

DEAR SIRS: Julius Novick's "Theatre: The Midwest" [*The Nation*, Sept. 5] is a comprehensive survey and, to my knowledge, a just appraisal, but for the sake of a complete record it should be pointed out that Chicago has a good though small repertory company in the Hull House Theatre. In the past two years the company has produced about a dozen plays, chiefly works of Albee, Pinter, Gilroy, Camus and Ionesco, all of them very ably directed by Robert Sickinger. *Carl W. Condit*

limit to courage

Lafayette, Calif.

DEAR SIRS: You commended California Comptroller Alan Cranston for his courage in blasting the John Birch Society [editorial, *The Nation*, Aug. 8].

But not long ago Mr. Cranston, with Governor Brown's enthusiastic support, was the leader in demanding successfully the ouster of Simon Casady as head of the California Democratic Council because of Casady's outspoken opposition to U.S. policy in Vietnam. Opposition to the war, the professionals had concluded, was a political liability for the party in an election year. Opposition to Birchism, even in California, is not yet a political liability. . . . *Joseph A. King*

believers

Budapest, Hungary

DEAR SIRS: Saul Bellow writes [letter, *The Nation*, Aug. 22] that I am "so wrong that we would have to go back to the beginnings of time . . . before reaching a single point of agreement." I am in perfect agreement with Mr. Bellow. It was really very wrong of me to believe that this distinguished novelist would read the whole of my article ["The View from the East," *The Nation*, July 17] and not only the paragraph about him. I can't believe ("Mr. Boldizsár is the wrong sort of Believer") that Mr. Bellow did read what I wrote, because, if he had, he would certainly have seen that there are many points of agreement between us, whether

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EDITORIALS

Storm Signals on the East River

Storm signals flew on the East River when the twenty-first session of the General Assembly opened on September 20. The foundations of the United Nations, already softened by a slow deterioration in critical areas, were further undermined by the Secretary-General's announcement that he would not offer himself for a second term. It is still hoped in some quarters, especially in Washington, that U Thant will agree to stay on beyond the end of the year, which he has set as a limit for his services.

Paradoxically, U Thant has been openly critical of United States policy in Vietnam. Washington's expressed eagerness that he should retain his post can be explained in part by the Administration's attempt to make it seem that its aims for Southeast Asia are similar to those of U Thant. The Soviet Union, also criticized by U Thant for the restrictions it constantly imposes on the functions of the Secretary-General, fears any change in the *status quo*. In the forthcoming months, maximum pressure will be applied on U Thant by delaying a real search for a successor. It remains to be seen whether his determination to leave can be worn down by this campaign of inertia and whether the interests of the organization will be served in the process.

The question of Vietnam, as such, is not on the agenda of the session, but the priority given today to Asian problems by the nations of the world was symbolized by the election of Abdul Pazhwak of Afghanistan as President of the General Assembly and by the opening speech of President Marcos of the Philippines. The topic of the Vietnamese war will occupy as big a place in the Assembly debates as the many inscribed items on racial discrimination in Africa, and is closely linked to the question of Chinese representation, which is placed once again on the agenda.

The impotence of the UN with regard to the major conflict of today has been staggering and has provided a sobering background for the usual glitter of the session's opening. The continuation and escalation of the conflict have brought almost to a standstill the machinery of diplomatic intercourse which had started to roll between Washington and Moscow. Meaningful negotiations during the session could lead to a treaty desired by the two space powers on the internationalization and demilitarization of the moon and other celestial bodies. However, the expectation is that the Soviet Union will raise secondary issues to prevent an agreement, which would be hailed by many as a sign of renewed *détente* but is sure to be denounced by Peking and Communist parties the world over as another proof of Soviet "complicity with the American aggressors."

This new low in the ability of the UN to act as an instrument of peace may jolt the membership into making another attempt to bring the Vietnamese conflict to the conference table. The present rigidity of policies in Washington, Hanoi and Moscow seem to preclude that hope, but miracles do happen sometimes — especially if they coincide with the interests of some of the major powers. The UN has, on some occasions in the past, served as a catalyst for dramatic turns.

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The need now is to abandon rhetorical slogans in favor of fresh appraisals and quiet diplomacy. The first days of the Assembly have already emphasized the desirability of clarifying the attitude of both Hanoi and Washington on U Thant's three-point program. In his opening address before the Assembly, Ambassador Goldberg elaborated around rather than on this plan without departing really from old positions, but the style of the propositions he put to Hanoi could result in a new step in the dialogue. Both the new President of the General Assembly and the President of the Philippines have announced their availability for renewed efforts toward a solution. A settlement by the UN, in the absence of both Hanoi and Peking, is unthinkable, but the nations gathered in the General Assembly could create the atmosphere needed for a new and candid search for peace. Perhaps the storm signals will save the UN ship from actually hitting bottom.

ANNE WEILL-TUCKERMAN

The Pattern

Malcolm S. Forbes, the publisher of *Forbes* magazine, is disturbed by the Pentagon's plans to add another 300,000 troops to the 300,000 already in Vietnam (not counting the 70,000 men in the Seventh Fleet operating off the coast). "How bloody dumb can we get?" Forbes asks. Is it impossible for us to stop escalating? "Why, why, can't we stand and hold?" He is also worried by the government build-up in Thailand. There we have only 30,000 at the moment, but up in the north the Communists are said to be active. Predictably the Thai government, and our present forces, will soon be menaced, and the ante will be raised in Thailand as it was in Vietnam.

As with Vietnam, the Administration is attempting to obscure the real thrust of American policy while, at the same time, it steadily increases the U.S. investment in men, materiel and installations. If no great public outcry is raised, it will soon be in a position to say of Thailand what it now says of Vietnam: "Withdrawal is out of the question; we are too thoroughly committed." Senator Fulbright, who remembers how the American commitment in Vietnam was achieved — by a steady, almost imperceptible commitment of troops under cover of an information policy which deliberately sought to minimize the increase — wants to prevent a repetition of the same pattern in the case of Thailand. To this end, he wants to hold public hearings so that the nation may know what it is that we think we are doing in Thailand.

The Administration, of course, has tried doggedly to prevent any hearings at all. In essence, this was the pattern followed in Vietnam. In his book, *With Kennedy*, and in a recent interview in *U.S. News & World Report*, Pierre Salinger tells how President Kennedy sought to minimize the public's awareness of the military build-up that began in Vietnam late in 1961. It was Salinger's view at the time that this was a mistaken information policy; in the end the facts would become known, as indeed they did — but not before the entire character of our presence in Vietnam had been transformed by precisely this build-up. It is already very late in the game to prevent a repetition of this pattern in Thailand, but Senator Fulbright is to be commended

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for trying to focus attention on Thailand before we find ourselves committed there, by the sheer magnitude of our investment, to ends and purposes which the Administration is reluctant to disclose to the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, much less to the public.

Bigger Than Adam

Adam Clayton Powell stands out among his fellow Representatives on several counts. He is certainly one of the most intelligent, and his political dexterity is a marvel. He is a rogue, but such an engaging one that it is difficult to become indignant about him. And with all this — and a colossal record of absenteeism and neglect of duty — he is the chairman of what one of his critics calls "undeniably . . . the single most productive House committee in each of the past two Congresses."

Now by a vote of 27 to 1, with 3 abstentions, the members of his Education and Labor Committee have pruned the powers of the chairman in two key areas: selection of personnel and expenditure of funds. But Powell will remain as chairman. For obvious political reasons, such a compromise was foreordained. Probably none of the members wanted to chastise Powell so severely that his usefulness as a legislator would be ended. To Powell's credit, it should be noted that once he realized that this time he had pressed his luck too far, he acquiesced in the majority's decision with at least the appearance of good grace.

What is alarming about the incident in retrospect is the extent to which Powell could rally responsible Negro leadership to his support. When he saw himself cornered, he swung at once into action with the race issue, which he raises as glibly as a Birchite blames all the woes of the country on communism. That in some quarters there is some latent bias against him because he is a Negro — a very equivocal Negro in several respects — may be conceded, but to regard this as the gravamen of the complaints against him is ridiculous. There are too many perfectly sound and cogent reasons for Congress, and particularly the members of his committee, to be annoyed with him. To support him on this issue is a kind of racism in reverse, with every prospect of disadvantage to the Negro's struggle for equality.

It is understandable that Negro leadership should rally to Powell's support. There are not so many effective Negro Congressmen that a reduction in the status of one of them — and he by far the most powerful — can be regarded with indifference. Still, black or white, a Congressman is supposed to serve his constituency and also to serve a larger public, regardless of color. On balance, Powell has been a wretched Representative. Harlem is satisfied with him, and can return him for the rest of the century for whatever reason seems good to Harlem voters. It may be that his flamboyance and his payroll manipulations are political assets. An informed Negro quoted by Tom Wicker in *The New York Times* (September 21) says that many Negroes "feel he's been getting away with murder and they enjoy seeing him put it over on the white man." Nothing could be more natural. But to say, as Bayard Rustin does, that "we've got to put our foot down against racial discrimination in Congress, and this is the place to do it," makes no sense. Nor is it easy to follow A. Philip Randolph along the same line: "To single out Congressman Powell can only encourage the suspicion that Congress has a double standard."

Defense of Powell on this basis is as vulnerable as Powell himself has become through his own actions. His qualities are so mixed with misbehavior and demagogy that he is a poor prospect for a *cause célèbre*. Nor is it true that Congressional chairmen are never deprived of powers they have misused: it happened to Rep. Tom Murray (defeated in a primary this year), who represented the 7th Congressional District of Tennessee, and there have been other instances. If a case can be made for Powell, in this or some future controversy, let it be made on the merits and not on the ground that he is a poor, persecuted black man.

Making It Hurt

The resistance of Governor George Wallace and the Alabama legislature to the U.S. Department of Education's "mandatory" guidelines for integrating elementary and high schools has at least served to point up that in dealing with states that just don't care what happens to their Negro students the federal government has very little leverage outside the courts.

If the Alabama school districts—following the mandate of their legislature—refuse to integrate, what can the U.S. Department of Education do about it? Some $35 million, under Title I of the Education Act, could be withheld from the state as a whole. But this money is supposed to be spent for special education projects in *low-income neighborhoods*. In the South, that means Negroes especially. That is by far the largest amount that could be withheld under any of the programs, and since Negroes would be the big losers, what does Wallace care?

Alabama could lose another $1.7 million for library books, but that isn't enough money to faze a state. And it could lose about $1.3 million under Title III, for "innovative programs" such as bringing culture to rural schools. Last year 200 gifted high school students attended a music institute at Auburn on this money, and a string music project for pupils 4 to 6 years old was conducted after school and on Saturdays in five counties. It is the very sort of thing that the country people of the South need if they are to become civilized, but on the other hand a little less polish isn't going to bother the South one way or the other. The second largest amount that Alabama could lose would be about $6 million for aid to impacted school areas; that is, school districts that have to take care of servicemen's children without getting taxes from them. That will hurt, but it won't crush.

These programs could help bring Alabama into the mainstream of American education. The same is true of federal money that is going into other Southern states, which are regularly the most backward schooling states in the nation. But do they care enough to integrate on the threat that the money will otherwise be withheld?

It's doubtful. Al Alexander of the Department of Education's Civil Rights Division calls the present standoff a "cat and mouse affair." He says that acting on the so-called mandatory guidelines is "like applying Sunday blue

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laws — they're on the books, but how do we apply them?"

Even when it is discovered that school districts are not showing good faith at all in following the guidelines, the process of cutting them off federal funds is very involved and time consuming. Alexander admitted that it could be a year or more before Alabama was officially dumped. In the seventeen Southern and border states only thirty-nine school districts have been cut off.

A punishment that hurts impoverished children first is not the proper method to employ, and another lever must be found. It could be a blanket integration rider to all appropriation bills that contain money for the states. If no federal money could be spent on highways serving segregated school districts, if no federal money went into defense and allied work within a long commuting distance of segregated schools, etc., *that* would get Negro children into Southern schools — even Alabama schools. The federal government has kept an uncooperative South alive on highway, defense and pork-barrel money too long.

The New Group Leader

President Johnson took no chance after his distressing experience with Prof. Eric Goldman, who returned to Princeton with harsh words and an anti-Johnson book gestating in his head. The President's new liaison with the intellectuals is Prof. John P. Roche, who comes from Brandeis. Eager to rehabilitate the image of the intellectuals in the eyes of his chief, he started off by describing those who have bad relations with the Administration as "a small body of self-appointed people who live in affluence on Cape Cod and fire off salvos against the vulgarity of the masses." Another set of "alienated intellectuals" are the "artsy-craftsy" cabal represented by the *Partisan Review*, the *New York Review of Books* and similar publications. " 'The West Side jackal bins,' I call them," said Roche, and "mainly high-class illiterates." All this was vouchsafed to columnist Jimmy Breslin, selected as the spokesman for the new apostle to the intellectuals.

It would perhaps have been better if Roche had waited until he could sit down at his desk in Washington. Nicely synchronized with his blast, Malcolm Forbes, the Wall Street publisher, as noted elsewhere, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., cracked down on Mr. Johnson's Vietnamese adventure. Schlesinger has had considerable experience in the halls of government, and so has Richard Goodwin, who has been publicizing similar views. John Kenneth Galbraith is another who has been keeping up a drumbeat of criticism. And George Kennan. And Dr. Spock. "Just a small group and it won't change," Roche summarized. Judging by this blast-off, before the President gets rid of Roche he may wish he had Goldman back.

Usury — What Else?

Long before economic truth emerges in American news media of general circulation, it is often to be found in the trade, industry and small media press. Such is the case with the roundup titled "10-City Check Finds Loans Are Costlier and Harder to Get," by Eileen Shanahan, in the September 6 *New York Times*. The real estate aspect of Miss Shanahan's piece is old hat for readers of McGraw-Hill's *House & Home*, which back in January was headlining, "Wildest Market Staggers Mortgage Men and Jars Builders." The sum and substance of it is that in realty financing, as in other money markets, usury has become a way of life. That it is not *called* usury, that it is legal or at least unpenalized, does not alter the fact.

The gimmick which makes usury respectable in the mortgage field is the "point" system, a point being 1% of the face value of the loan. As many points as the traffic will bear are levied as a lump payment preceding the execution of a mortgage loan. As Miss Shanahan discreetly puts it, "Where interest rates are held down, by usury laws or custom, 'points' go up as an indirect means of adjusting the interest rate to today's tight money conditions." The lower the interest rate, and the higher the risk the lender feels he is running, the more points he demands. Where the ostensible interest rate is less than 7%, the point charge is commonly 6 to 8. On FHA mortgages, where the legal interest rate is limited to 5.75% by federal law, a point charge of 10 to 12 is not unusual on older homes. If the neighborhood is not "particularly good," as many as 18 points may be added.

With a mortgage at 5.75% and a 10-point fee payable in advance, a $20,000 loan nets the borrower only $18,000 and so the interest rate is jacked up to 6.4%, which adds roughly $1,300 to the total interest paid by the borrower over a term of twenty years. In many parts of the country it is impossible to get a legitimate FHA mortgage, and borrowers pay the surcharge or do without the loan — which usually means doing without the house. Consequently the building industry has been hard hit.

But that is only part of the story. Getting a mortgage loan may also involve an "arrangement fee" of 2%. All these exactions are on top of the higher FHA interest rate, which has gone up from 5.25% at the beginning of the year to the present 5.75%, and is expected momentarily to rise to 6%. The cost of a 0.5% interest rise to the buyer of a house mortgaged for $15,000 increases the total payments over thirty years by $1,674.

Home improvement loans, which are relatively short term, are yielding an average of 10%. In many cases these funds are not borrowed to enlarge or improve the house, but to keep it habitable, as when a new roof must be put on because the old roof is leaking too badly to be patched—which may be because the builder had to pay so much for construction money that he used the cheapest shingles he could get.

It may be argued that the point system on mortgages is no worse than the system whereby a borrower ostensibly pays 4.5% on an automobile loan but in reality is paying 10% in true annual interest, or as much as 13% where money is especially tight. While mortgagors pay interest only on the unpaid balance as they pay off on the principal, on auto loans interest is charged on the full amount, even though it is progressively reduced by monthly payments of principal. The argument is valid, but it means only that the financial community charges all that the traffic will bear on any kind of loan, and the notion that limits are enforced by law or regulated by a sense of equity is just another comfortable fiction.

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CHINA: TWO VIEWS & A PROPOSAL

China is still "on the dark side of the moon" not only because of the ancient myths and superstitions referred to by Robert Elegant but also because the United States has elected to seal itself off from vital sources of information in China. During the entire span of a period when China has been caught in the throes of a profound social revolution, we have been long-distance viewers of and listeners to what is going on there. True, we boast—and the boast may well be justified—that American studies are second to none if measured in terms of money and personnel devoted to the study of China. But vital dimensions of insight and understanding are lost when direct observation is lacking. A team of scholars poring over documents in a research institute, interviewing persons who have visited China, reading transcripts of radio programs and studying pronouncements of the Chinese Communist Party can no doubt piece together a fairly coherent picture of what is happening. But there is no substitute for on-the-spot, continuous, day-to-day observation. Nor should it be forgotten that our intelligence services have made some whopping misjudgments about China in the past, as for example the CIA's blithe assurances that China would not enter the Korean War even if we did waltz right up to the Yalu River.

Currently there is no more important subject than China but it presents obvious journalistic difficulties. American editors must perforce improvise, using the reportage of Canadian, British and French observers. We present here two views of China, and a proposal for responding to its international ambitions. Mr. Elegant is the Los Angeles Times *correspondent in Hong Kong. He has been described as "one of the best of the hardy breed of second-hand news gatherers, the China watchers." Keith Buchanan, a geographer, is a member of the faculty of Victoria University of Wellington. Mr. Elegant is an outsider, a listener. Mr Buchanan is known as a sympathizer, but he has visited China recently and he has been there before. As a geographer, he has been particularly interested in rural China. In addition to differences in point of view and angle of vision, this circumstance accounts in part for the difference in emphasis and conclusions in the two reports. But it should be noted that apart from obvious differences in interpretation, both pieces stress certain developments—the fear of* embourgeoisement, *the attempt to create a new man, etc.*

And these themes are echoed again in I-Kua Chou's proposal for diplomatic maneuvering, based on an unraveling of China's motives and goals. Mr. Chou is both insider and outsider: Chinese by birth and a graduate of Fuh Tan University, he received his Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and now teaches in the Department of Government at Southern Illinois University.

Read together, the three pieces present a better picture of what is happening in China, and how the world might react to those events, than any one of them would provide separately. —The Editors

Visit to a Fourth of Mankind

KEITH BUCHANAN

In a masterly survey of the Vietnamese conflict, *Les Américains face au Vietcong,* the Swiss journalist Fernand Gigon makes it clear that to many who shape American policy, Vietnam itself is of secondary importance. Behind the tragic and cumulative horror of the struggle, the one word, China, is imprinted on the minds of the military. This fact was driven home to him by his visit to the monstrous base at Danang which, he observes, "has scarcely any relationship to the Vietnamese war." Rather, along with Okinawa, Cavite, Formosa and the Seventh Fleet, it is part of an enormous steel jaw opening on China. His visit to the aircraft carrier *Coral Sea* confirmed this impression: "in less than three hours the Seventh Fleet could wipe out fourteen years of superhuman efforts. . . . But afterwards?"

Yet, returning to China for the third time since 1958 in May and June of this year, I was impressed above all by the calm determination with which the Chinese quarter of humanity was going about its immense task of building a modern society and a modern economy. From the hotel window, the factories and power plants of Canton could be seen against a gold-hazed evening sky; below, in the vicinity of the hotel, the grass was soft and green, patched with the shade of young trees and dotted with groups of children and young people (some of them members of the hotel staff) sitting talking, playing football or dreaming in the shade of the trees. The atmosphere of quiet and peace seemed paradoxical in view of the progressive military encirclement of the country, the destructive capacity of the war machine poised off China's coast, and the reminders of this menace in the shape of United States air intrusions over southeast China. Yet the next few weeks, spent in nine of the eighteen provinces of what geographers call "Agricultural China," convinced me that this first impression was in no way erroneous; though it is obvious that the Chinese are aware of the destructive forces poised above them. Recent changes in China's superstructure (the "Great Socialist Cultural Revolution," as they term it) indicate this; such changes represent a "clearing of the decks" to meet the threat of war. The efforts to complete the present Five-Year Plan within three years is another sign of the sense of danger. Posters on the communes and in the factories remind the masses of the realities of war beyond China's southern frontier and what this may mean to China.

There have been major changes in the physical and mental landscape of China since my first visit in 1958. The differences in the urban landscape make the first and in some ways most dramatic impact. Much of the center of

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Peking had been rebuilt by 1958; now it has been remodeled once again: eight-lane highways fringed by belts of trees and shrubs cut through the city core, and major complexes of housing, scientific institutions, factories and offices expand far into the suburbs. Peking is, of course, the capital and a special case, yet the developments here are matched on a smaller scale in the other cities I visited—Loyang, Taiyüan, Sian, Nanking, to mention but a few. The Chinese leaders recognize an immense pressure of unfilled housing needs; given conditions in Old China, that is not remarkable. What *is* remarkable is the progress made in a program of urban development that involves not only housing and roads but also essential services, industrial plants and parks.

The countryside, no less than the city, has changed. Industrial decentralization has created new nodes of industry deep in the rural areas (e.g., the factories along the railroad from Peking to Loyang). The consolidation of a wide variety of small commune-run industries, ranging from oil pressing to jade working or electroplating, is a decisive achievement for what was one of the most backward rural societies in Asia. Flood control and water-conservation works in the delta lands of the Yangtze and the Pearl Rivers, terracing and tree planting in the subhumid areas of north and northwest China, are at once transforming the physical landscape and introducing a new security into rural life. Meanwhile, the individual peasant plot and the policy of agricultural diversification (most obvious in the dairy herds, the orchards and the vineyards on some of the Hopeh communes) are helping to break down the old carbohydrate-based economy with its impoverishing dependence on a limited range of food grains.

Changes in the mental landscape are less easy to assess because of the barriers of language. There is certainly a great emphasis on the necessity for self-reliance in economic developments. This stems partly from the abrupt cessation of Soviet aid and shows itself in attempts to find specifically Chinese solutions to problems rather than, as was the tendency in 1958, adopt uncritically the techniques that had succeeded in the very different conditions of Soviet development. The country now faces its socio-economic problems more realistically. Thus it acknowledges the "long haul" needed to catch up with the advanced nations, and sees the dangers of emphasizing quantity rather than quality in the output of industry and the problems posed by the rapidly expanding population. The nation is also driving to eliminate the relics of "bourgeois" ideology, its goal being designed to prevent the emergence of "revisionist" policies of the Soviet type and to forestall the possibility that the masses, having seized power, will forsake their revolutionary principles. And, as an element common to all these changes, China's time perspective is lengthening; it is becoming preoccupied with the emerging generation on whose shoulders the struggle to build a modern—and Socialist—China will fall.

An outsider on the scene who attempts to evaluate the general situation in contemporary China finds himself reaching conclusions drastically different from those offered by much of the Western press. The "purges" of intellectuals and of party officials that were making headlines in Hong Kong in late June appear as a normal continuation of the

process of establishing a proletarian state that was formally initiated in 1949. In the years after 1949, the masses took over the economic bases of the country; they are now expanding the Socialist revolution into the cultural and ideological fields. The people's communes, dismissed again and again as gigantic failures by the Western press, appear to the observer on the spot as stronger, more flexible, more full of exciting prospects than at any time since their inception. As far as the internal economy is concerned, the supply of commodities and prices is in balance, many of the shortages of the early sixties (e.g., pork) have been overcome, the general price level dropped about 2 per cent in 1965, while the cost of some articles was reduced sharply (e.g., the price of bicycles was cut in half). The 1965 development plan was overfulfilled and the relationship between the various sectors—agriculture and industry, heavy industry and light industry—has been improving. In its foreign trade, China has a favorable balance of payments and a currency that has achieved a stability that might be envied by many countries; in 1965, the nation's major foreign debts (those to the Soviet Union, totaling 1,406 million new rubles, of which 1,000 million were for the supply of equipment in the Korean War) were paid off.

Chinese industry has recovered the momentum it had lost, partly as a result of the withdrawal of Soviet technical aid in the early sixties. Today industry contributes some two-thirds of the gross national output of China, and within the industrial sector heavy industry contributes about three-

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fifths of the total. Chinese industry has gone a good way toward strengthening some of its weak links; thus, the country is now self-sufficient in petroleum products and the chemical industry increased its output of chemical fertilizers by almost one-third in 1965. The country now produces 90 per cent of the special steels needed in modern industry —an example of the emphasis on quality and diversification rather than on quantity. As for more sophisticated products, Kurt Mendelssohn reported in *Eastern Horizon*, Hong Kong, in July, that "the Chinese make their own electron microscopes and Chinese-built hydrogen and helium liquefiers have been operating for several years."

My trips to China in 1964 and 1966 were directed mainly to gathering information on developments in the rural sector; even so, to provide some basis for comparison with the situation in the countryside, I made a point of visiting industrial establishments that ranged from large-scale modern enterprises such as the China Foodstuffs cannery at Canton, the Number 2 Cotton Mill at Peking and the chemical fertilizer plant at Taiyüan to the tiny back-yard enterprises which have become an important element in the Chinese industrial scene.

The equipment of the bigger units is largely Chinese (the Taiyüan plant was designed and partially equipped by the Russians but to complete it many of the big components had to be designed and made by the Chinese themselves). Technically, this modern industrial sector is impressive but perhaps even greater gains have been made in the social and welfare fields. Canteen and crêche facilities are excellent; the housing complexes associated with each major factory offer accommodation that is clean, comfortable (though austere to a visitor from an affluent society) and cheap. Rents appear to be approximately 3 to 5 per cent of the worker's salary; medical services for the workers are free, generous provision is made for the worker who is ill, and after retirement (55-60 in the case of men) pensions range from 50 to 80 per cent of wages on retirement. Wage levels are low by Western standards, but the "spread" is relatively narrow; thus the average at the Number 2 Cotton Mill at Peking is 60 yuan per month, with a range from 40 yuan to 150 yuan (this latter for the manager and engineers) while at the Shihwan pottery complex near Canton (employing 8,000) the average monthly wage is 56 yuan, rising to 110 yuan in the case of a limited number of highly skilled workers. One *cattie* (1.1 lbs.) of rice, for comparison, costs 0.13 yuan.

Perhaps more interesting than the big plants are the small back-street factories developed with slender resources by small groups of individuals, and the part-work, part-study schools which are turning out relatively complex equipment for the state factories. The "Butterfly" boot polish factory at Taiyüan illustrates the type of industrial development that contributes importantly to China's industrial output. It was started in 1958 by a group of eleven women and four old men. The buildings—scarcely distinguishable from the local old-style house—were built by the group with "borrowed" timber and bricks from the old walls of the city; the wiring was put in by a couple of members of the group who had a rudimentary knowledge of electricity. Today it employs thirty-four workers and produces annually some 60,000 dozen tins of polish for export to West Africa and the Middle East. Wage levels are based on the workers' needs: the average is 28 yuan per month, the director (a woman) gets 45 yuan, one of the older workers who has five children gets 60 yuan. In seven years the enterprise has "delivered" 120,000 yuan to the state and accumulated 90,000 yuan; this has been used to expand production and build houses for the workers.

A small electrical plant in Nanking was organized by the local street committee as a unit employing seven youths; today it employs eighty workers, mainly girls under 25, and produces a range of electrical control gear, including mercury switches. Four-fifths of the equipment has been built by the workers themselves; the total cost was thus a fraction of what it might have been had all the equipment been purchased (17,000 as against 100,000 yuan).

The part-work, part-study schools, developed as part of the new education policy, also contribute to the country's industrial output at the same time that they educate a new generation of technicians. There are 110 such schools in Peking, offering a four-year course which includes politics, Chinese, mathematics, physics, engineering designing, structural engineering, welding and specialized courses (e.g., principles of metallurgy). In the later stages of their study the students are able to build such complex items of equipment as lathes and power presses, and these are supplied to the state. Such schools practice that integration between mental and manual work which is one of the basic aims of Chinese educational policy today.

I visited a dozen people's communes in late 1958, half a dozen in 1964 and some twenty in 1966. By 1964-66, it had become clear that the commune, in its revised and more flexible form, was here to stay; it is the fundamental unit of organization in the countryside, in other words, of 80 per cent of China's population. From an original 26,000 in 1958, the number of communes has risen to approximately 80,000. This increase appears to be due largely to the subdivision of communes in the upland and interior areas which, owing to topographical conditions, proved too large for successful management. The average population of a commune today is 7,500, though there is a considerable range: There are 55,000 people in the China-Korea People's Commune near Peking, while the average in Shansi is 10,000, in Kiangsu 24,000, in Kwangtung 30,000. The three-tiered structure, commune-brigade-production team, is firmly established, though there is little uniformity in the size of the subordinate units; the number of brigades on four communes near Peking ranged from five to twenty-one, and the number of teams to a brigade from five to thirteen. In this tiered structure the commune as a whole retains control of activities demanding large-scale units of organization for their proper functioning (e.g., the more specialized industries, the tractor station, hospitals or certain sectors of education), while other productive activities are decentralized and the team becomes the basic accounting unit. Along with these changes, a small individual sector is now permitted. The cultivated area in individual use ranges from 3 per cent to 7 per cent according to commune. In addition, a considerable part of the poultry and pig production is carried on as an individual activity.

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In its present form, the commune enabled the peasant population to weather the difficult years of the early sixties. It has subsequently played a major role in reshaping the Chinese countryside. Collective measures of water conservation, such as the digging of wells and the construction of storage dams and irrigation and drainage systems, are continuing on a large scale. By virtue of such projects, the planned rate of agriculture increase was somewhat exceeded in 1965, in spite of local droughts. More than 40 million people were engaged in water management last winter.

The commune has also provided the framework for a continuing expansion of the terracing that is changing the face of many parts of China. In south China, the red lateritic hillsides are terraced for the growth of nitrogen-fixing green manure crops which are composted for use on the cultivated lands of the valleys; this practice has spread with remarkable rapidity since 1964. The eroded loess country of Shansi and Shensi in north China has achieved spectacular results with terracing to control erosion and create new "microplains" suitable for the intensive farming of China. An outstanding example is on Dachai Commune in eastern Shensi, where figures of 2,400 man days to create 1 acre of terraced land are quoted. The case of Dachai is important in two respects: first, it involves an investment of labor on a scale unthinkable in Western farming economies; second, the development has been completely self-reliant in that the people of the area, ravaged by drought and flood, have themselves, with nothing but their own resources, carried out a remolding of their environment which eliminates these old sources of disaster. It is the "self-reliance" of Dachai that Chinese commentators most strongly emphasized as a model for other rural areas.

The commune has also provided conditions for industrializing the countryside. The range of industries varies:

most communes produce their own bricks and tiles, most have workshops sufficiently well equipped (and a labor force sufficiently skilled) to build simple machinery and manufacture all save the most complicated items of replacement needed to keep their tractors and lorries in operation. Many operate food-processing industries, some produce relatively sophisticated pottery or other crafts, most make simple farm tools and have the resources and the expertise to design and build pumping and irrigation stations. Much of the industrial employment is seasonal (and this overcomes one of the great problems of the past—the underemployment or unemployment resulting from a highly seasonal cropping regime); and on exceptional communes the proportion employed in such seasonal industry may reach one-third of the labor force.

The "technical transformation" of China's countryside is still in its early stages and there can be no doubt that the priority given to water conservation is correct. The second great need is for manure. As far as chemical fertilizers are concerned, my data show consumption levels ranging from about 5 to 750 pounds to the acre. At first sight, it would seem that China could use many times its existing output of chemical fertilizers, but the careful composting of all vegetable wastes, the use of algae and pond mud, the use of the hillsides as a source of green manure for the lowlands, and reliance upon night soil and pig manure suggest that it is not accurate to judge the country's needs for such fertilizers in the light of Western or Japanese agricultural experience. Third and fourth priorities are for better strains of seed and improved farming systems. Mechanization, by contrast, remains a long-term objective and poses a host of technical and economic problems; at present, while up to nine-tenths of the land is tractor-plowed on some unusually advanced communes, the average for China as a whole is about one-tenth.

Wages on the communes are based on a work-point system and they vary not only between communes but also among the teams within a commune. A cross section of a score of communes showed average wages ranging from somewhat under $60 to $160 a year; of this, the proportion paid in kind ranged from 17 to 50 per cent. The income from "side occupations," such as individual production of crops or livestock and the sale of manure to the collective,

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may add an extra 10 to 25 per cent to this basic sum. The extreme range in incomes, excluding side occupations, was of the order of seven to one; between the different teams on one commune the highest range noted was from two to one. Thus considerable differentials arise from contrasting soil and water resources and the type of agriculture (vegetable-growing teams earn considerably more than grain-growing teams on the same commune). The official attitude to this situation is that a more equitable redistribution of income, whether by taxation or other means, would be undesirable; that it is a more positive policy for the poorer team or commune to raise its level, aided by the experience and example of more advanced collectives. Applied to China as a whole, this means that the richer and more developed communes can be regarded as "oil spots" whose example will spread.

The wages quoted must be seen against a background of generally low prices for essentials, and of a peasant society in which housing, schooling and medical treatment are free and items such as electricity are cheap. The progress achieved must be judged not in the light of what we expect from our own affluent societies but in the light of conditions in other emergent countries. Rural housing shows great diversity and, on the communes visited, only a small proportion of the population was housed in newly built dwellings. Nevertheless, a start has been made and most communes have construction teams and allocate funds for the erection of new public and domestic buildings. But the task of rehousing almost 25 per cent of humanity is immense and will occupy decades; meantime, first priority must be given to food production and to welfare and education.

The progress in public health has been remarkable. Most of the larger communes have an adequate medical staff (the China-Albania Friendship Commune near Peking maintains forty-five doctors and medical workers for 25,000 people). These include some practitioners of traditional medicine, but the majority are trained in Western methods, though with an abbreviated course of training. Frequently each team includes one member who has received first-aid and medical training and who can cope with accidents and simple diseases, while some of the larger communes run their own hospitals. These developments have eliminated many of the old killing diseases and thus accelerated the population growth rates. On the other hand, the gradual dissemination of adequately equipped hospitals is making possible the control of population through clinical abortion and sterilization. On one commune in Kwangtung, 50 per cent of the wives or husbands in marriages which had produced two children had been sterilized voluntarily and abortion had become a socially accepted form of population control.

The collectivization of Chinese rural society provided a framework not only for economic development or the diffusion of modern medicine but also for a massive development of schooling at all levels. Again it is difficult to generalize, because the development of education has, as a result of reliance on the activity of the people themselves, varied in detail from commune to commune. All communes run numerous elementary schools (the numbers on the communes I visited ranged from eight to sixty-six), as well as middle schools and part-work, part-study schools. The state sometimes provides either elementary or middle schools, and some of these offer courses of high quality. An example was a middle school on a commune near Nanking whose laboratories were admirably equipped, which had a good library (including many foreign books) and which offered advanced courses in English. The most interesting and significant development, however, is the part-work, part-study school which aims to eliminate the distinction between intellectual and worker, and which may emerge as the dominant type of educational institute in the next decade. The rural schools of this type are as impressive as their urban counterparts; they offer a three-year course during which the students will work on the school land (one such school near Taiyüan has 150 acres of land, 530 students and 109 staff and cadres) and also go out into the countryside, offering their knowledge and acquiring experience by working on the communes in the district.

This diversity of institutions is unified under a dominant theory: the role of education is to create a new type of Socialist man. The proposition extends also to the visual arts, to the theatre, the film, the press, and to literature as a whole. To consolidate their revolution the masses must establish their control over the ideological superstructure as effectively as they did over the state and the economy in 1949. This means removing from office all those suspected of having used their influence — whether as the rector of a university or the editor of a newspaper — to inculcate "bourgeois" ideas, and it is this "cleanup of the dust left hidden" (to quote the *People's Daily*) that explains the "purges" of the last month or two. In the thousands of wall newspapers—on gray paper, white paper, paper of all colors—that I saw in the University of Nanking, in the streets, in schools far out in the countryside, posters criticizing, accusing, counterattacking; in the noisy, good-humored, gong-beating processions, there seemed to be little concern with the "struggle for succession," discussed in some Western newspapers, but rather a very great concern with the quality of education, the integrity of the educators and the ultimate objectives of education. The mounting wave of criticism by students and many teachers, of an education system that was an amalgam of mandarin-style teaching and Soviet and Western educational concepts, achieved its goal when, in mid-June, entrance examinations to universities were abolished and an interim period of six months was set aside to devise a new system of enrollment from the upper levels of the middle schools.

Just what form the education system will assume is as yet unclear; as a Chinese colleague put it to me: "Not even the Soviet Union succeeded in creating a *truly* Socialist education system, and we do not know yet what form it should take; that's what all these poster displays, processions and meetings are about." The repercussions of the present "cultural revolution" will extend into every sphere of life and thought and will doubtless be interpreted in divers ways by the Pekinologists of the West. To the Chinese it represents an inevitable unfolding of the events which began in 1949, and an essential prerequisite to the emergence of "the new Socialist man." To me it looms as a development whose importance—and global implications—will dwarf even the massive remodeling of their physical environment in which this Chinese quarter of humanity is engaged.

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The Enormous Revival Meeting

ROBERT S. ELEGANT

Hong Kong

When I was a small boy, a favorite game left the grassy fields of suburban New York pocked with pits to trap the unwary. It was called Digging to China. We knew we would get there if only we dug straight enough and deep enough because China was exactly on the other side of the globe. We never did reach China.

Despite the frustration of our pioneering instinct, we knew a great deal about that contrary country. We knew that the Chinese wrote backwards, not only from right to left, but from top to bottom, instead of across the page. We knew that they began their meals with dessert and ended with soup, that they gave girls' names to boys, and that men wore skirts and women trousers. We knew many other things which also appear slightly askew in the light of more direct and, presumably, more mature knowledge.

Yet we knew a great deal more than we realized. Above all, we knew that the Chinese were quite different from the men and women of our comfortable American middle-class world. Weary of too much apparent knowledge and too much illusory certainty about China, I sometimes feel that that simple clarity, now almost three decades past, was the beginning of true understanding. The Chinese are different from us in their formal manifestations, even if they are not direct opposites.

The other side of the globe is commonplace today. Man-made devices have even circled the far side of the moon, though their exploration has enlightened mankind but little. As far as the opportunities for effective mutual observation have gone in the past decade and a half, the Chinese might almost live on the far side of the moon. Even less than the occasional Westerner who is conducted through China, deaf to the spoken word and blind to the intricate ideographs, have the Chinese, by direct observation, altered their preconceptions about either the outside world or their own nature. Nor does the prevailing darkness on the other side of the moon give off much light.

But the ether surrounding China has, since April, been charged with words, alternately bitter and boastful—and, often, as tantalizingly indistinct as the Herzian emanations caught by the astronomers' telescopes. Distorted not by time and distance but by passion, the words are intended for the Chinese. Still, any simple radio receiver will intercept them for the listener in Hong Kong on the edge of the far side of the moon.

Since the beginning of May there has been one chief theme, which has developed and widened. Waves of denunciation have resounded across China from the broad plains of Manchuria to the narrow, rock-bound farms set among the misty crags of Kweichow. Harsh male shouts have contended with sharp female cries above the dark muttering of throngs. The mass meetings have bellowed their spontaneous indignation at the "traitors, the anti-party, anti-Socialist elements, the devils with the spirits of snakes and the souls of oxen, the bourgeois agents, who plotted in coordination with international revisionism and imperialism to destroy socialism and bring back capitalism." Giving only perfunctory attention to their familiar antagonists, "Khrushchevite revisionism and American imperialism," all radio programs have hailed the "great new victory for the thought of Mao Tse-tung," which was won in Peking, the holy city of Chinese communism.

It was a strange victory.

At the beginning of June, a brief announcement noted the dismissal of Peng Chen, Mayor of Peking and first secretary of the Peking Municipal Committee of the Communist Party. The entire Peking committee was also dismissed because, for the first time in the history of the People's Republic, an erring group had resisted reformation en masse. All members of the committee were denounced as henchmen of a "black gang" which had deliberately set out to thwart the party's will and bring about the recrudescence of capitalism by curious means.

On the far side of the moon, the pen is, it appears, still more dangerous than the sword, and the pen was the chosen weapon of the anti-party group. In their journalistic commentaries, in their collections of essays, and in their historical plays, the writers concerned had sought to undermine the confidence of the Chinese masses in the canonical *Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, and to supplant it with "a bourgeois view of the world." Not only the ranks of the Communist Party

Scarfe, London Daily Mail: Ben Roth

Let A Hundred Flowers Perish

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but the "power of the state" itself was shaken by the ruthless attacks of the squadrons of bourgeois penmen, the Communists averred. Even today, the immediate enemy overcome, the party continues to warn that socialism in China is engaged in a conflict with capitalism graphically described in Chinese as a "you live, I die; I live, you die" struggle.

The victorious legions of Marxist orthodoxy did not grow complacent with the defeat of the hapless Peking Committee and the suppression of its sinister publications. As its first official action, the new Municipal Committee removed other "bourgeois agents" from control of Peking University, the seedbed of the Communist revolution. In the provinces, vice governors, Communist Party cultural directors and newspaper editors were relieved of their duties to the accompaniment of "drums and dancing," as the Chinese has the term Peking usually translates as "fanfare." No drums or dancing have enlivened the quiet meetings of Regional Political Departments which are plucking dissidents out of the economic structure throughout China. But those sessions are an integral part of the process of removing from critical positions discredited professional writers, academicians, journalists, managers and technicians. The ultra-orthodox faction now in command has affirmed that the only wisdom which is valid in the new age is the wisdom of the "worker, peasant, soldier masses."

All persons possessing skills derived from higher education are in greater or lesser degree corrupted by "bourgeois thought." Even those who came of "pure proletarian backgrounds" have been contaminated by those "bourgeois scholarly authorities," their teachers. Many of the erring intellectuals are being dismissed; others are "struggled with," in the stark Communist phrase, until they recognize their faults. Seeking to escape the familiar pitfall of recalcitrance among the educated, the Communists have already been lured a long way along the road toward dependence on the "innate" technical skills of the masses, who are presumed to be ideologically pure. From 1958 to 1960, during the first Great Leap Forward, that road led not only to a great victory for *The Thought of Mao Tse-tung* but to economic and administrative chaos.

It is still not clear how far this new victory will be pursued. The Communists themselves display an uncharacteristic imprecision, in contrast to the certainty with which they announced the plans, at once detailed and sweeping, for the transformation of men and society by the first Great Leap Forward. But the tone of the mass meetings throughout China has already begun to shift from Marxist denunciation to Maoist uplift.

Having cast out the devils of revisionism and slain the monsters of capitalism, the enormous revival meeting which is China today is reaching toward new exaltation. The essential purge will continue and expand until all opponents who escaped all the previous purges are eliminated. But the emotional tenor in China now recalls the promises of transfiguration which heralded the first Great Leap. The Chinese press ecstatically predicts a "great new era in the history of mankind." The glamorous phrases of the earlier period are being refurbished: "the wisdom of the worker, peasant, soldier masses," subdued during the years of recovery; "the imminent transition from socialism to true communism," that state of secular bliss which Karl Marx so gingerly forecast and Mao Tse-tung later proclaimed could be achieved through spirit, rather than matter; and "the creation of a new kind of human being," Maoist man, whose advent will liberate mankind—and the Communist Party of China—from all difficulties.

In just one editorial the Peking *People's Daily* carelessly revealed the stinging reality behind those portents. "The cultural revolution now under way, on a scale never known before," the party's organ declared, "necessarily foreshadows a development of the Socialist revolution by leaps and bounds and a new Great Leap Forward in China's Socialist construction." Premier Chou En-lai having confirmed that the "national economy has entered a new, leaping phase," extravagant claims of industrial and agricultural productivity now resound.

China, it appears, is to be thrust into another great convulsion in a second grand attempt to bend the laws of material nature and human nature to the will of the Communist Party. China's organs of opinion quite candidly warn that the nation must be purified of "remaining bourgeois influence," which is strong and insidious. They are only slightly more reticent in their implicit admission that China's industrial base hardly qualifies it as a great power, and they have just begun to admit that China's population is now at least 700 million. Since the true figure is probably several tens of millions higher, population growth appears to be consuming, even before it is produced, whatever surplus the economy can throw off. External observers feel that only massive foreign aid could halt that self-consuming spiral. But the extremists who now hold power in China believe that a massive deployment of human labor inspired by the uniquely correct thought of Mao Tse-tung can accomplish miracles.

The concrete aspects of the new Great Leap Forward are still being shaped, for the newly purged Central Committee has been forced, by a combination of its own impetuosity and the intra-party power struggle, to move before its plans were fully cast. The Communists' awareness of their previous errors indicates that they will seek to avoid those specific excesses which aroused greatest popular resentment and contrived the greatest practical failures from 1958 to 1960. Mass compulsory labor, total social reorganization, separation of families, and the segregation of the sexes, the breakdown of the food supply, and the lavish, wasteful use of manpower on a host of simultaneous, grandiose projects simultaneously maladministered—all those disastrous aspects of the first Great Leap should be subject to greater restraint. But the Communist Party may find itself unable to stem the momentum of the new Great Leap. Excess has already appeared in the widespread purge—and even more general alienation—of precisely those men and women who are most essential to economic progress, the trained administrators, publicists and technicians.

The new Great Leap may also find itself incapable of avoiding excess because of its unique sponsorship. Despite their generous praise for their fighting forces, the People's Liberation Army, the Chinese Communists always adhered to the practice of traditional Chinese civilization, and kept the military in a subordinate political position. But the

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sword has now prevailed over the pen. Effective control of China now lies in the hands of the Liberation Army. Defense Minister Lin Piao, a field marshal before formal ranks were abolished last year, is the single most powerful man in the country and the heir apparent to Mao Tse-tung. The rough soldiers, who believe that they have always conquered all the enemies they have met, are imbued not only with bounding self-confidence but also with a simplistic approach to psychological and economic problems. In a recent joint declaration with their European—and sole—ally, Albania, the masters of China affirmed that stringent coercion and a militarized state would remain characteristic of true Socialist countries until they entered the blessed realm of total communism, when the state disappears. The Chinese Communists are now engrossed with the period of coercion, presumably feeling that the eventual paradise can see to itself.

The term Great Leap Forward, which slipped into the editorial in the *People's Daily*, has not been repeated. It is likely that the Chinese people will not for some time be told "with fanfare" that they are in the midst of a new Great Leap Forward. They were not told of the creation of urban Great People's Communes in 1959-60 until those new social organisms were a reality. The party obviously knows that the simple terms themselves arouse enormous antagonism and stimulate the opposition it is determined to crush.

The Chinese under communism, then, are strikingly different from most of humanity. Having just recovered from the shattering experience of the first Great Leap, they are poised for a new Great Leap. Disturbed by the persistence of opposition, though it is mild by comparison with the violent discontent provoked by the first Leap, they are adopting measures which appear certain to stimulate strong opposition. Having attained a reasonable standard of living, characterized by an adequate supply of foodstuffs and a growing trickle of consumer goods, they are about to hazard the newly attained stability of their economy. Having alienated a good part of humanity by their assertive statements and their intrusive foreign policy, they are intensifying their assertions and threatening more penetrating intrusion. It is tempting to shrug and wearily concede that things are simply upside down in China.

But there is a consistent pattern in the news from the far side of the moon. In terms of their own logic, developments in China display a definite internal order. Whatever understanding is possible unfortunately requires an examination of first premises.

A state of contentment, gradually expanding, is unacceptable to China's ideologues because it leads to *embourgeoisement*. They recognize that nearly seventeen years of intensive effort have by no means wholly destroyed that Chinese civilization which endured for more than 2,000 years, and they fear that civilization's creeping back to

Juhl, Copenhagen: Ben Roth

Down With Culture

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cover all their works. The Chinese hierarchy is dismayed by the example of the Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev and his successors, "who are worse than Khrushchev." They believe, with much justification, that increasing material gratification inescapably engenders demands for even greater material gratification. They admit that they fear above all else the "recrudescence of capitalism" in China as a result of such demands, which compromise the selfless dedication that is the essential quality of a "true Marxist-Leninist." Their fundamental belief has, in fact, evolved beyond dialectical *materialism* into a creed which can most concisely, if clumsily, be described as dialectical *spirituality*. Continuing conflict between opposites they exalt as the fundamental condition of nature, but the essential conflict for them takes place in the realm of the human spirit.

Political life has now engorged all other aspects of life in China. In their political life the Chinese have, for at least two millenniums, been wholly ideological in a manner unknown in the Western world. Their church has always been dedicated to a mundane purpose—the establishment of utopia here on earth through the creation of the perfect human being. The conscious ideal of creating the "new man" was first enunciated in a collection of aphorisms called *The Great Learning*, which appeared almost half a millennium before the birth of Christ. From approximately 200 B.C. until the beginning of the present century, Confucianism, the state ideology which delineated the political structure, the individual's personal behavior, and his relation to the supernatural, sought to create the perfect man in the perfect society. Even the reformers who fought to remake Confucianism at the end of the last century, the rebellious "Westernizers," took as a guiding principle the shaping of a new man to meet the new times.

It is hardly remarkable that the Chinese Communist regime is captivated by the traditional ideology it so vehemently rejects, for all revolutionaries are shaped by their origins. The present hierarchy consciously seeks the creation of the perfect Communist man in the perfect Communist society. Feeling that they will have failed fundamentally unless they can impose their own new morality on the Chinese people, the hierarchy seeks to compel the Chinese to that transformation by forced emulation of heroes varying in quality from the omniscient Chairman Mao himself to self-sacrificing private soldiers. Emulation was the Confucian way.

The Communists are also impelled to reassert the dominant political and cultural position China enjoyed in the world known to it before the onslaught of the West in the 19th century. The perfect society and the perfect human being must, they feel, be created everywhere in the world under their own "uniquely correct" tutelage. Marxism's assertion of universality has combined with the Confucian ideal of bringing order to *t'ien-hsia*, "all that is under the heavens," to confirm them in that wider purpose.

The Chinese lack the material resources to carry out their inspired mission, while they find their human material within China increasingly intractable. They have won no striking victories in their campaign to remake the world by substituting dedicated human beings guided by an inspired ideology for the weight of metal. "People's war," the employment of guerrillas and subversion to overthrow established governments, has proved unsuccessful in South Vietnam and disastrous in Indonesia. Lesser Chinese reverses have occurred in Africa.

But the Communists are mesmerized by their own obsessions. They cannot abandon their purposes without negating their lives' endeavors. They are, therefore, compelled to one more attempt to remake both the Chinese people and the Chinese economy through another Great Leap Forward. Because Mao Tse-tung tells them so, they know that all things will be possible once they have "completely remade the thinking of the masses." Because they have no choice, they must believe that they can accomplish miracles of industrialization and agricultural expansion by the intensive application of human labor. Then China will be the compelling model for the entire world.

Despite its institutional uniformity, the glory of Chinese civilization has always been its protestant tradition. Under the most stringent repression of the Confucian empire, courageous men with independent minds always dared to challenge official obduracy and to speak out against oppression. They were often forced to make their points by indirection in the settings of novels or plays. They were often punished for their effrontery.

No more than was the empire is the Communist state a seamless unity. Despite the most intense intellectual repression China has ever known, courageous and independent men have managed to publish their reproaches. The party has now discerned a deep-laid plot in the works of a few writers who dared to follow the old tradition of criticism after the first Great Leap. It is more likely that they came together informally, drawn by their common concern for the future of their country.

Mao Tse-tung's withdrawal from the day-to-day business of the state, perhaps because his health is failing, transformed such opposition into a major crisis within the leadership of the party. Peng Chen, only fifth after Mao in the party, appears to have allied himself with the moderate group because it represented his best chance of attaining power. He seems to have felt that he enjoyed substantial support and that he had to act immediately or be swept away himself. Peng—and other leaders still unidentified—therefore joined with the men who cried against the prospect of another Great Leap Forward, arguing: "My God, not again! The people are reasonably happy, and the economy is reasonably stable. Let us build on what we have already built. Let us not essay another wild leap into chaos in pursuit of an unobtainable ideal."

So spoke the pragmatists. They challenged the most orthodox, who knew that the preservation of their own power required of them the strictest adherence to the extreme policies of Mao Tse-tung. Even in death, the shade of Mao Tse-tung is to protect his successors, who are aware that his personal prestige is a chief buttress of the regime. He has therefore been canonized in his lifetime, and his works have been enshrined as the highest expression of human wisdom.

Only one man enjoys adulation almost as intense as that accorded Mao Tse-tung. He is the winner in the power struggle and the present ruler of China. First Deputy Prime Minister and Vice Chairman of the Communist Party Lin Piao this year is exalted for his "creative application of

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the thought of Mao Tse-tung." The party's ideological Bible, *Red Flag*, has just instructed its readers: "The fundamental point is to learn how to consistently place Mao Tse-tung's thought in the forefront of all work and to absorb Comrade Lin Piao's highly important instructions on the living study and application of Chairman Mao's works." Such homage is reserved by the meticulous protocol of Communist China for the man in full command of day-to-day operations.

Lin triumphed in the brief power struggle because of his complete control of the People's Liberation Army, which is today hailed as "the chief pillar of the state." The military have now penetrated almost all the major centers of power, and they are, in truth, the driving force in China. The directives for the present purge have come not from the *People's Daily* but from the organ of the military, the *Liberation Army Daily*. The responsibilities of power may yet temper the rough-hewn zealotry of the military, but they now appear determined to pursue their chosen course to the end.

With the defeat of the pragmatists, China is now, once again, a scene of vast confusion. "Every counterrevolutionary restoration starts in the realm of ideology so as to remold public opinion," the dominant clique has warned. It has proclaimed a vast "cultural revolution," which it describes as the greatest, the most intense and most sweeping thought reform campaign China has known. The economic convulsion is about to begin.

This new climacteric will be the third and, almost without question, the most profound in the brief history of the People's Republic. Each such convulsion has been followed by a period of relaxation, and each such period of relaxation has lasted longer than its predecessor. Collectivization in 1955 and 1956 was followed by the relaxation of the brief Hundred Flowers Movement in 1957. The first Great Leap Forward of 1959-60 led to the gradual recovery of 1961-64.

The new Great Leap Forward bears every sign of being the most abrupt and most vicious since the Communists came to power. It may not be too much to hope that it will be followed by a period of true and lasting relaxation. The zealots will be discredited by the failure of the new Leap Forward that they are themselves contriving by their own extremism. The moderates who succeed them will possess all the evidence they need to demonstrate that China cannot possibly triumph in a continuing confrontation with both the laws of nature and the nations of the world outside.

Then the messages from the far side of the moon may become more intelligible, and the logic that prevails there may become more like the logic that prevails elsewhere.

BETWEEN GOALS AND DOGMA

An Opening for Diplomacy

I-KUA CHOU

Communist China currently concentrates all its foreign policy efforts on denouncing Soviet revisionism, and that, in effect, reflects its inability and unwillingness to see the need to modify its hostility toward the United States. It has adjusted its relations with all other nations in order to strengthen its anti-Soviet and anti-American strategy. In doing so, however, it has breached one of the tenets it accuses the Soviet leaders of having violated: that of drawing a clear-cut line between the "imperialist" powers and the Communist countries. It has increased its trade significantly with such countries as West Germany, France, Great Britain, Japan, Canada, Australia and Argentina. It maintains a hybrid relationship of trade and cultural exchange with many countries whose ties with the United States have prevented them from establishing normal diplomatic relations with Peking. It has begun to shift its sources of modern machinery from the Communist bloc to the capitalist countries of the West. It cannot hope for long to persist in a policy of noncooperation and of fomenting conspiratorial violence in non-Communist countries if its program of modernization and industrialization is to be realized through trade and collaboration with the world at large.

Therefore, in the long run, a further relaxation of the Chinese Communist rigidity is in prospect. This may take place regardless of what group succeeds to political power in Peking. Even if there should be an ideological reconciliation between Moscow and Peking, China's total dependence upon the Communist countries has become a thing of the past. Were it not that Vietnam posed the danger of a wider war, the non-Communist world could really have sat back and watched the unfolding of the Sino-Soviet clashes, enjoying the full benefit of a disintegrated Communist camp.

While, for the time being, the danger of a direct collision between China and the United States over Vietnam has been averted, it is by no means certain that an ever-widening war, which has already engulfed Laos and Thailand, will not produce a military confrontation between the Chinese and the United States. It is true that both Peking and Washington have repeatedly stated that they intend to make no war upon each other; but it is also true that Peking insists upon its "just action" in supporting "the revolutionary struggles of all oppressed peoples and nations abroad" and that the United States is equally determined to apply, in Secretary Rusk's words, "a counterweight of real power to Chinese Communist pressures." Thus, a situation of permanent crisis prevails between China and the United States, and there is no indication that the tension created by the policies of both sides in the past sixteen years will soon subside.

The sources of conflict are diverse and profound, but the most fundamental and everlasting of them is the fact

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that both China and the United States seem to endorse a doctrine of intervention that is almost universal and all-inclusive. Since Peking claims (as does Moscow) the right to speak for mankind, the United States, in addition to the security arrangements concluded with some forty-two countries, acts generally to defend the existing system of the non-Communist world and to put into effect countermeasures against possible Communist take-overs. The justification for the Chinese Communist doctrine of intervention is that since, according to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the "bourgeois" system of any country must be overthrown, it is Peking's "internationalist duty" to give a Communist revolution unconditional support. The justification for the American doctrine of intervention seems to be that any form of social change is permissible except that which is promoted by the Communists. As interventionists, both sides propose to sit in judgment on the legitimacy of the political processes of a given country, to determine the form and the speed of its social change and to remold its political institutions.

The United States policy toward China was not at first geared to Peking's strategy of promoting the world revolution through "people's wars," launched by indigenous elements in a given country and assisted by military and political aid from outside. It was geared, rather, to the traditional concept that an aggressive China might seek territorial aggrandizement at the expense of its neighbors, and to a large extent that view still holds. However, the recent emphasis on counterinsurgency and the Johnsonian doctrine of stopping "guerrilla aggression" with the superior fire power of a mobile tactical force, indicate gradual adjustment of a strategy originally conceived for preventing Soviet expansion to a strategy for halting Communist uprisings inspired by the doctrine of Mao Tse-tung.

There is now general agreement on what Chinese communism is. It looks for a Communist revolution in every land, sees progress only through conflict, and identifies itself with the nationalist yearnings of the developing nations. In the National Liberation Movement, it envisions a process for the emancipation of mankind. It equates a country's independence with its complete severance of economic and political ties (not necessarily diplomatic) with the United States. It operates on the assumption that either all the Communists must strive at all times in a "continuing revolution" to bring about a world "without imperialism and capitalism," or they will lose whatever ground they now hold. There is no middle course, and there is little room for compromise with the adversary.

However, there are divergent views as to what Chinese communism is not. And the fact that in China nationalist objectives are sometimes intertwined with Communist objectives has made it difficult to determine what exactly Peking is trying to achieve at a given moment. I believe that it is possible to sift out the elements which are generally associated with Chinese communism but which really have nothing to do with it, and to distinguish the nationalist from the Communist goals. A successful separation of

Piciel, Calcutta: Ben Roth

Global Strategy

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these problems, it is hoped, will contribute to a better understanding of Chinese communism and, more important, to the adoption of more effective and realistic policies toward it.

Chinese communism does not propose to use the homeland as a base for marching Chinese troops into neighboring states and converting them to communism. (Both the Nationalists and the Communists regard Tibet as an integral part of China and no international tribunal has established it as an independent country.) No country along China's borders has turned Communist since the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949. North Korea and North Vietnam went Communist by virtue of the Allied occupation policy agreed upon at Potsdam at a time when China itself was still in the hands of the Nationalists. The Russian occupation army converted North Korea into a Communist state; and, after having taken over Vietnam from the Japanese, Ho Chi Minh's Independence League (Vietminh), supported by Chiang Kai-shek and blessed by the United States, began to win a victory over the French. It was only after the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, a decision which may very well have been made by Stalin, and the subsequent reversal of the United States policy, that these countries were regarded as the outposts of an enemy.

The Chinese Communist foreign policy objectives are not limited to a Communist Asia. Nor are they confined to a Communist sweep of the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. They are aimed at uniting one-third of the world's population — those people living in the less developed lands — as a starting point for the world revolution. On the grounds that Moscow had assigned only a minor role to the tasks of the National Liberation Movement and that Moscow's enthusiasm came only after Peking had protested that it was lacking, Peking has sought to discredit Russia by attempting unsuccessfully to exclude it from Communist activities in these countries. This, in turn, has brought on the vindictive Soviet charges of Peking's "racism" and "hegemonic plans" to dominate the NLM, which have found ready support in the West. But there is no evidence that the rulers in Peking give priority to communism in Asia over Communist enterprises elsewhere. They, like all Communists, view communism as a global system rather than an occasion for military conquest in geographical terms. A strike in Lima, a demonstration in New York, a "peace" march in Stockholm are greeted with the same enthusiasm that is engendered by an uprising in Bagdad, an armed coup in Somalia or a switch-over in Havana.

Regional hegemony presupposes limited goals and a recognition of the regional hegemony of other powerful states in other regions. There is nothing in the entire body of Chinese Communist doctrines, official pronouncements and the party-controlled press to indicate that Mao and his supporters would be happy with the 19th-century technique of dividing the world into "spheres of influence." Indeed, the question of whether the relationship among independent nations ought to be one of subordination or equality is a principal issue of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and Peking has championed the independence of Communist countries from the control of Moscow. To the countries of the Third World, Peking has persistently preached that equality and economic independence are the only true tests of sovereignty and that political independence qualified by either American or Soviet control of economic life is the essence of neo-colonialism.

Cultural influence is not equivalent to political domination. Whatever the form of its government, China has always had and always will have a significant cultural influence in Asia, ranging from food, costume, medicine and etiquette to arts, religion and social mores. But politically China faces the most difficult tasks in countries where the Chinese minority is the largest, such as Indonesia. A Communist government in North Vietnam, for example, cannot be regarded automatically as an extension of Chinese control over that country, and the absence of American control does not necessarily mean the presence of Chinese control. Burma and Cambodia are able to maintain their independence by refusing to identify themselves with either China or the United States. Indonesia virtually destroyed the Communist movement without foreign reaction. It might not have succeeded in doing so had outside military power been involved.

Chinese communism as such has little popular appeal in the developing nations. It merely attempts to rally these states around certain common denominators — beliefs, policies and sentiments shared by all the backward countries, China included. It identifies itself with their nationalist aspirations as a first step for an eventual Communist seizure of power. Through anti-colonialism, Peking seeks to dissociate the new nations politically from the advanced countries. Through anti-capitalism, Peking preaches the virtues of public ownership of land and industries and the need of the poor nations to budget through planning, to protect their own inexpensive resources and manpower and to insulate themselves by a protective wall (closed society) against such deleterious effects of world capitalism as wage and price spiral, inflation, depression and monopolistic control. Against the common desire for modernization and industrialization, it invokes the danger of imperialist servitude hidden in aid from the great powers.

In practice, Peking has had little success in gaining adherents to its revolutionary theory; and its anti-Soviet and anti-American propaganda has usually boomeranged. If some new nations are willing to heed Peking's expostulations, they usually recoil from its grand scheme of world revolution. The overall performance of Chinese communism has, therefore, been a dismal failure. Peking's impatience and its attempts to shorten the stages of revolution, from the bourgeois democratic to the Socialist revolution (to use Marxist terminology) in Indonesia, for example, have brought only disaster. If the main thrust of the Chinese Communist challenge lies in the realm of ideology or what may be called "verbal aggression," and if Peking elects to support indigenous Communist groups and their allies anywhere in the world regardless of geographical location, what is the most effective way to cope with it? Is containment really the most appropriate policy? Containment was meaningful in the forties when the Soviet army under Stalin posed a threat to Western Europe and when the United States enjoyed a monopoly in nuclear weapons. Is it equally applicable to the current posture of Communist China toward other countries? The answer to this question

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

London Daily Mail: Ben Roth

depends upon whether it can be established that Peking plans territorial expansion into the neighboring states.

Here, the Communist drive for world revolution can be separated from China's nationalist goals — goals which have been adhered to by every Chinese government since 1911 — such as the desire for international equality, the consolidation of frontiers and the establishment of effective control over Chinese territories, as in Taiwan. Peking sought Russia's help to achieve these goals, and, in each case, it was rebuffed. Moscow refused to give China more aid than it could afford to pay for, or to share with it Soviet nuclear technology. In regard to Taiwan, Moscow suggested that Peking might consider the two Chinas solution, and, in the Indian frontier dispute it sided with India, bearing in mind that it has its own frontier dispute with China to settle. These issues, exacerbated by ideological differences, have strained the Sino-Soviet relations to a breaking point. There is no doubt that Peking overplayed its hand along the Indian border, but the Chinese Communist Government learned, as did all the previous Chinese governments before it, that nationalist objectives cannot be achieved through the assistance of a friendly power, that only adequate national power will succeed.

Between 1962 and 1964, Peking concluded border agreements with all of China's neighboring states, except India and the Soviet Union, pledging to respect their political independence and territorial integrity. It still desires boundary treaties with India and the Soviet Union, although negotiations have broken down in an atmosphere of political vituperation. Peking could have settled all these issues had Mao Tse-tung and his associates not put the tasks of the Communist revolution before China's national interests, and had they not elected in 1949 to rely solely upon the Soviet Union for assistance and to sever all of China's relations with the United States. Despite repeated emphasis that China plans no territorial aggrandizement, its incessant cries for armed struggle against imperialism, however justified from its own viewpoint, have prejudiced the non-Communist world against the fulfillment of China's legitimate goals.

The notion that China must be contained is a legacy of the Korean War. The Chinese Communist intervention in Korea produced in the United States a military-oriented policy for Asia which includes trade embargo, security treaties and military bases along China's frontiers. The recent deployment of Soviet armed forces to Mongolia to prevent the pro-Chinese factions from seizing power and to the Sinkiang and Manchurian frontiers, together with the massive aid to India from both Russia and the United States, have created in Peking genuine fear of "encirclement." All these external pressures, plus the irritation of the Vietnamese war and the failures of foreign adventures, would have toppled any other government in China, but the Communists do exercise absolute control and the deified Mao, with the support of the military and the youth, has smothered all effective opposition. In foreign affairs, Peking now clings to two courses which it deems vital to its interests: through anti-revisionism it tries to salvage whatever prestige and support it can still enjoy among the Communist countries and parties, and through the development of nuclear weapons it hopes to produce a deterrent that will help it break through foreign encirclement in the manner of Russia in the late fifties.

The key to peace in Asia, and in the world, lies with the United States. Although this is not a propitious time for the United States to make a drastic change of its policy toward China, it holds two trump cards which, if skillfully played, may induce important changes in China by appealing to the country's nationalist interests.

First, in regard to Taiwan, some measure of agreement can still be reached without prejudicing the positions of the parties involved. Following thirteen months of bilateral negotiations in Geneva between 1955 and 1956, Peking had agreed to accept Secretary Dulles' proposal that China and the United States jointly pledge to use only peaceful means in settling international disputes. Mr. Dulles had suggested specifically that Communist China could renounce the use of force in the Taiwan area without having to give up its claim to the island. The negotiations became deadlocked when Peking insisted that its renunciation of force in Taiwan be contingent upon renunciation by the United States of its mutual defense treaty with the Nationalist government. Sometime in the future, it may be advisable for the United States to pick up where Mr. Dulles left off and negotiate with Peking a general declaratory agreement concerning peaceful settlement of international disputes and the settlement of rival Chinese claims over the island by peaceful means. Such an agreement would solve nothing, but it would contribute greatly to the easing of tension between the United States and China, and thus perhaps lead to agreements on other larger issues.

Second, Peking's recent proposal, that China and the United States conclude an agreement pledging that neither

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country will be the first to use nuclear weapons against the other, offers the United States a chance to deflate Peking's militancy in international affairs. The successful conclusion of such an agreement could mark the beginning of a new era in which Peking would seek to achieve such objectives as security and equality directly with the United States. Any move to increase Peking's freedom of action in foreign affairs will mitigate its belligerence. A non-first use agreement might make it easier for China to take part in disarmament negotiations and to accept other plans for world peace such as the proposed nonproliferation treaty. Any such development would have a moderating influence upon the anti-Soviet and anti-American campaigns in China and profound effects on China's political temper.

Since most of the issues involving the United States and China have been the results of the politics and ideologies of the two countries, grossly inflated by the missionary zeal of the Communists and the anti-Communists, there is little that other countries can do to alleviate the tension. The United Nations has been powerless in cases involving highly political and ideological conflicts, and the exclusion of Communist China from its bodies has forced Washington and Peking to pursue their policies toward each other without it. The more the two countries rely upon the bilateral approach, the less compelling for Peking is access to the channels of multilateral diplomacy. If the proposed two Chinas solution (keeping the Nationalists in the United Nations while admitting the Communists) should ever be adopted by the world body, it will become a new device to exclude Peking indefinitely, for it has made abundantly clear since 1950 that it will never pay such a price for entry.

Ultimately, Chinese Communist ideological intransigence can be modified only through the inter-party struggles within the Communist camp and through internal changes in China. Only the moderate Communists can tame the radical Communists. There is nothing that the United States can do to reduce Peking's ideological belligerency; political and military pressures will merely perpetuate it. What the United States can do, however, is seek limited agreements concerning China's nationalist objectives. When Washington and Peking can agree on the substance of China's legitimate national interests, peace in Asia, and in the world, will begin to move from dream to reality.

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS I

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

LEO PFEFFER

On October 3 the Supreme Court opens its 1966-67 term and its docket indicates that as in previous terms in recent years, its constitutional law cases will be almost exclusively in the field of civil rights and liberties. That has not always been the case: 1966 marks the 175th anniversary of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, and the Court took almost 150 years to recognize itself as guardian of that great document. This year thus provides an appropriate occasion to review and evaluate the Court's successes and failures in that role. Beginning with this issue we are publishing three articles by Leo Pfeffer under the general title, "The Supreme Court and the Bill of Rights," which seek to reach an objective and balanced judgment on the Court's performance in each of the three major areas of American liberties—freedom of expression, justice and equality.

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The omission of a bill of rights from the document submitted to the American people in 1787 almost resulted in its rejection. The fifty-five men who gathered in Philadelphia, though recognizing that all authority ultimately came from the people, were hardly oversolicitous for the liberties of the people. On the contrary, most of them felt that the people could not be trusted with the liberties they already had, and looked to the Constitution primarily as an instrument for the restraint of some of those liberties. Madison, defending the omission, expressed skepticism as to the value of a bill of rights. Experience, he wrote Jefferson, had shown its inefficacy on those occasions when its control was most needed. Reflecting the consensus of his fellow delegates, he suggested that the greatest threat to civil liberties came not from government but from "overbearing majorities," and as to these a bill of rights was little more than a parchment barrier.

Ultimately, recognizing that unless a bill of rights were promised, the people would not approve the Constitution, he went along. A bill of rights, he agreed, does have some modest value against government. It could have a moral value in constituting a "good ground for an appeal to the sense of the community" in cases of abuse by authority. Moreover, if a bill of rights were inserted in the Constitution, "independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights."

The new nation's first encounter with a major violation of the people's liberties seemed to indicate that Madison was wrong on at least two of the three counts. The assault came from government, not from the people, and the tribunals of justice, particularly the members of the Supreme Court, were allies to the assault rather than guardians of the people's rights.

Barely seven years after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, with its First Amendment prohibition on laws abridging freedom of speech, Congress passed the Sedition Act for the punishment of anyone who uttered or published sentiments tending to bring the government or its officials into disrepute or to excite the hatred of the people. The Supreme Court itself never had occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of the Act (it was repealed after two years and all persons convicted under it were pardoned by Jefferson); but the individual Justices, in their enforcement of the Act as circuit court judges, left no doubt as to how they would have acted

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as a body. Individually, they not only upheld its constitutionality and enforced it vigorously but conducted trials under it with complete abandonment of judicial dispassion and impartiality.

It is questionable that Madison was right even with respect to his third prediction, that the Bill of Rights would serve as "good ground for an appeal to the sense of the community." The people were sufficiently enraged by the Sedition Act to sweep the Federalists out of office in the election of 1800, but the anger was motivated not primarily by the fact that the Act was a violation of the First Amendment but rather that it was a usurpation of power by the national government as against the states and was aimed against the opponents of war with France, who by 1800 were in a great majority in the country.

The truth of the matter is that in times of crisis our nation has had a low tolerance for political dissent, and appeals to the sense of the community have not proved of much help. The lot of political dissenters has been a heavy one, from the Tories in the Revolutionary War to the left of Center during the McCarthy period, and perhaps beyond. Nor have our political leaders, even the most liberal of them, acted much above the common sentiment. Jefferson's record on freedom of political expression was, as Leonard Levy has shown, at best ambiguous. Lincoln had no sympathy for the rights of the "wily agitator" and acquiesced in the suppression of the press by the military. Wilson refused to pardon Socialists and pacifists jailed for opposing our entry into World War I, and it was his attorney general who was responsible for the notorious Palmer raids after the war. Franklin Roosevelt authorized the detention and relocation of Japanese Americans during World War II; the loyalty programs and the attorney general's list were promulgated during Truman's administration, and only time will tell when escalation of the Vietnamese war will bring an end to Johnson's already strained patience with dissenters.

What has been the record of the Supreme Court in relation to political dissenters during times of crisis? On the whole, unfortunately, not very much better. The next encounter with political dissent the Court experienced after the Sedition Act of 1798 came out of the sedition acts of World War I, and while the participation of its members was less activist and partisan, the net result was the same. If the Court accepted for itself the role assigned to it by Madison as particular guardian of the people's rights, it failed miserably in playing that role. Apparently the only case in which the Court reversed a conviction arising out of opposition to the war was one in which the attorney general himself asked it because he became convinced that the defendants (some twenty-seven South Dakota farmers who had petitioned the government officials that the draft quota for their county was too high) should never have been indicted in the first place. What is particularly deplorable is that every one of the cases in which the Court upheld convictions came to it after the war had ended in victory, so that the Court would have taken little risk in challenging the still remaining passions and prejudices. As Justice Clarke, along with Holmes and Brandeis, one of the

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oft-dissenting trio in these cases, said in one of his dissents, the Court had and should have exercised the power "to correct, in this calmer time, errors of law which would not have been committed but for the stress and strain of feeling prevailing in the early months of the late deplorable war."

The first major case to reach the Court resulted in a decision that has been acclaimed almost universally as a landmark by constitutional historians, and upon which, in large measure, rests Holmes's reputation as a great, if not the greatest American judge and liberal. Some Socialists had printed and distributed to men who had already been drafted and were awaiting induction a leaflet stating that capitalist Wall Street was responsible for the war, that the draft was unconstitutional and that the government had no right to send American citizens to shoot up the people of other lands.

The most stringent protection of free speech, said Holmes, would not protect a man from the penal consequences of falsely shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre. The question in every case is whether words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about an evil which Congress has a right to prevent. In the case under consideration there was a clear and present danger that some of the recipients of the leaflet would in fact be induced by it to resist induction into the armed forces, and therefore the defendants' conviction must be upheld.

Thus was the "clear and present danger" test born, and with it Holmes's reputation as a libertarian. Yet, ironically, it was first used to reject rather than uphold a claim of freedom of speech, and represented a substantial retreat from a position earlier taken by Jefferson and later espoused by Justices Black and Douglas. In his "Virginia State of Religious Liberty" Jefferson asserted that "it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order." Later, Black and Douglas were to assert that the First Amendment means what it says; that freedom of speech is absolute and no law may be made abridging it. What has most often been quoted from Holmes's opinion is not the phrase "clear and present danger" but the denial of the right falsely to shout "fire" in a crowded theatre, almost always with the critical word "falsely" omitted. When "clear and present danger" is quoted, it is practically invariably in a context that assumes that such a danger does exist. Indeed, "clear and present danger" has become something of a ritual incantation to be recited by a legislature, executive official or investigating committee about to engage in an assault on political unorthodoxy.

Of course, cases are decided by judges, not by legal tests, but "clear and present danger" has been a particularly slender reed for political dissenters to rely on. No sooner was it uttered than it was forgotten. All the other World War I convictions were upheld on the theory that Congress could outlaw and the courts could punish evil intent, and political dissenters could almost be presumed to have evil intent. When, in 1925, the Court upheld the conviction of Ben Gitlow for publishing the manifesto stating the causes that impelled the left wing to sever its independence from the Socialists and form the American Communist Party, it did so on the ground that if a legislature declares certain words or thoughts to be evil and their expression punishable, the courts must follow suit. Vainly, did Holmes, Brandeis and Clarke dissent plaintively that the clear and present test was being ignored in these cases.

It was not until the New Deal Court came into being in 1937 that clear and present danger was rediscovered and often applied. Yet rarely was it effective to uphold political dissent. Thus, for example, when in the late forties, a young Syracuse University student spoke to a group of some seventy-five Negroes in a well-policed hotel room and urged them to rise up in arms and fight for their rights, the Supreme Court upheld his conviction for disorderly conduct on the ground that there was a clear and present danger of disorder. Or, again, a straightforward application of the test would have required a reversal of the conviction of the Communist Ten for violation of the Smith Act, since even the most timorous of judges could not believe in 1951 that the government of the United States could be forcibly overthrown by the handful of Communist Party members who were not on the payroll of the FBI. Even when, in 1957, the Warren Court upset the conviction of the second-string Communists, it did so not by application of clear and present danger but by reading into the mind of Congress an intent it never had.

On the whole, the Supreme Court's record in protecting political dissent has been a sorry one. The Haymarket anarchists were liberated by Governor Altgeld, Mooney by Governor Olson, the World War I Socialists and pacifists by President Harding, Ben Gitlow by Governor Smith, and Sacco and Vanzetti and the Rosenbergs by death—in each case after the Supreme Court refused to intervene.

The record of the Vinson Court has been condemned as particularly bad; Prof. Fred Rodell, of Yale, for example, charged it with staging a "mass attack on civil liberties." But this condemnation is hardly fair; it ignores the truism that no agency of government, not even the Supreme Court, can protect the people from themselves. The brave and eloquent dissenting opinions of Black and Douglas were a luxury made possible by the fact that they were dissenting opinions and that Vinson's opinions represented the effective decisions of the Court. Had Black and Douglas each possessed three votes, so that their opinions would constitute the decisions of the Court, they would have spoken differently or the Court would not have survived. During the years from 1949 to 1954 the people of the United States would not have let anything stand in the way of their obsessive crusade against domestic communism. For the Court to attempt to speak reason to an irrational people would not have been merely quixotic, it would probably have been suicidal. During this period Herbert Lehman was almost alone in Congress in his defiance of Senator McCarthy. It was the liberals who, in 1954, shouted through an anti-Communist law so Draconian that even McCarthy doubted its constitutionality.

Since 1957 the Supreme Court's record in protecting political liberties has been splendid. With but a few exceptions it has upheld every challenge based upon freedom of politi-

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cal expression and association under the First Amendment. It has acted with a degree of caution (it has not declared unconstitutional the House Committee on Un-American Activities or the Smith, Internal Security or Communist Control Acts); but it has acted effectively. This new resolution came about not because the personnel of the Court changed but because the tenor of the times did. The explanation for these decisions lies in the termination of the Korean War, McCarthy's suicidal attack upon the Army, the growing *détente* with Russia, and the relaxation of cold-war tensions. Should the Vietnamese war continue to escalate and bring with it a return of the witch hunt, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will be able to offer much protection.

The sum of the matter is that the limit of the Court's tolerance of expression can be only moderately higher than the people's. Its record in protecting political dissent has been poor because the American people, particularly in periods of crisis, have been intolerant of such dissent. On the other hand, the American people have been exceptionally tolerant of nonpolitical expression, scientific, religious and aesthetic. The one publicized assault on scientific expression, dramatized in the Scopes trial, made Tennessee the laughing-stock of the nation and quite effectively discouraged all further efforts at restricting scientific expression. We have, throughout our history as a nation, also been widely tolerant of religious heterodoxy. Jehovah's Witnesses, the only religious sect which has suffered for its unconventional opinions (the Mormons were penalized because of their marital conduct) suffered because the expression of those opinions (by refusal to salute the flag) was considered basically political and anti-nationalistic and was treated as such by the American people. And notwithstanding our Puritan background, we have enjoyed, at least in recent years, a high tolerance for unconventional aesthetic expression.

As a result, Supreme Court tolerance in these areas has been even higher. Neither the Scopes case nor any other effort at restricting scientific expression has ever reached the Court; should it, we can confidently expect the Court to accord full First Amendment protection. After a number of false starts, the Court guaranteed the right of Jehovah's Witnesses not to salute the flag and protected other forms of their religious expression, particularly verbal attacks upon Roman Catholicism. (It was in these cases that the Court made the most effective use of the clear and present danger test.) It has outlawed religious tests for public office and has accorded nontheism all the rights enjoyed by theism. Notwithstanding its recent adverse decision in the Ginzburg case, its record in upholding the right of unconventional aesthetic expression has been almost perfect. In these areas, at least, it has fulfilled the hope, if not expectation, of Madison and made of itself in a peculiar manner the guardian of the people's rights.

THE BOMB IN THE CELLAR

SANDY MORRISON
Mr. Morrison, a free-lance writer, is at present completing a book on explosions.

At six o'clock in the morning of March 4, 1965, there occurred at Natchitoches, La., 150 yards behind a row of houses, an explosion so violent that it hurled one of its victims 60 feet from her bed. It tore a crater in the ground 70 feet long, 30 feet wide and 15 feet deep. Seventeen people died in the explosion and fire that followed.

Fifteen hundred miles to the north, on January 28, 1966, at 6:50 P.M., the basement of the Paramount Hotel in Boston blew up. The blast threw the floors of the lobby and the barroom against the ceiling and tore a hole in the sidewalk. Nine people were killed in that explosion.

Both explosions were of heating or cooking gas.

In Louisiana, the tragedy was the result of continual pressure of gas at 700 pounds per square inch against a weakness in the wall of the 32-inch pipe line carrying natural gas to the north and the east. But in the holocaust on Boylston Street the gas main had a pressure of only ¼ pound per square inch, and no internal stress burst the pipe. The break occurred first, and then the gas escaped. It collected in the basement of the nearby hotel and waited for ignition—the lighting of a match, the starting of an electric motor, even the ringing of a 6-volt doorbell.

Congressional attention has currently turned to the long-distance gas transmission lines because of a long series of accidents. Authorities are questioning the ability of these pipes to sustain the pressures they carry. According to a study prepared by the Federal Power Commission, in the period 1950 to 1965, more than 1,000 explosions or bursts occurred in these pipes. Sixty-four people have been killed and 222 injured.

Yet in this same period more people have died in explosions due to leaks in street gas mains than have been killed by high-pressure blasts. Official figures are not available, but a study of reports published by the National Fire Protection Association, a fact-finding body for fire departments, and the files of *The New York Times*, has produced a list of 170 deaths and more than 400 injuries in that same period. This is a minimum number, since the tabulation includes only explosions reported in the two sources.

The gas being sold to householders and industry today has no odor. A smell is added to make the gas recognizable should it leak, but as it seeps through the ground, the odor-forming substance is absorbed by the moist soil, and the gas continues onward undetected. Because it rises upward from mains, it tends to accumulate under basement floors, or to fill the hollow spaces in building walls. Thus, tremendous amounts of gas can accumulate before it is ignited. When such a pocket goes off, the result is as though the structure had been hit by an aerial bomb.

Gas flowing at a pressure of a mere ¼ pound per square inch is leaking from utility mains, yet the identical type of pipe carries water at pressure of 75 pounds per square inch,

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and without any leaks caused by internal force. What is wrong with the gas mains under our streets? Are they falling apart?

Some of the pipes in the gas utilities systems have been underground since they were laid out. Sixty-four major cities in the United States still use some mains that are more than 100 years old. These cast-iron pipes were sealed at the joints with jute packing overlaid with cement or lead. Originally, the plants manufactured their gas by the coking of soft coal. This gas was damp; it kept the jute packing swollen and tight.

Then the utilities discovered the virtues of the gas being burned off as waste at the oil fields. This natural gas, or methane, yields a heat of 1,000 B.T.U. as opposed to 500 B.T.U. of manufactured gas. By converting to methane, gas companies could double the number of customers they could serve without doubling the capacity of their mains. This was what they needed in the boom years following the Second World War. The sale of natural gas soared in the 1950s and has been rising ever since. Today, almost 99 per cent of our heating gas is natural gas.

But it wasn't long after the switch to pure natural gas that utility companies discovered their mains to be badly leaking. Methane gas is very dry. (It is so dry that 1,000 years ago the Chinese used it for drying the salt they took out of their brine marshes.) It shrank the jute packing and seeped out through the apertures. Some mains leaked so much that, as in the instance of a utility company in Kentucky, they were losing almost 60 per cent of the fuel brought from the transmission lines.

Gas enters a city at great pressure, usually at about 700 pounds per square inch (psi). Its pressure is brought down to about 25 pounds, and sent out in intermediary lines. The intermediary pipes tie into the city distribution mains by means of reducing valves, and gas flows into residential meters at about ¼ psi.

In Brighton, N.Y., a small town near Rochester, one afternoon in September, 1957, an explosion took place in a subsurface vault housing one of these reducing valves. The explosion itself caused no immediate harm to anyone in the vicinity, but it damaged the valve that converts the 25 psi gas to the ¼ pound pressure. The 25-pound gas, free of the restraint of the valve, raced through the low-pressure mains, seeking an outlet. It found it in all the gas meters in a twenty-five block area. Within minutes of one another, like timed demolition charges, forty-four houses blew up. Nineteen were completely wrecked and twenty-five were partially damaged. Fortunately, it was a time of the day when most people were out of their homes. Only three persons were killed and thirty injured.

Gas companies today employ a series of controls to eliminate the dangers of their modern product. An oil-and-water spray treats it as it enters the plants; it is humidified to prevent it from drying out the jute packing, and heavily odorized. Leaks and potential leaks are also prevented by fastening metal sleeves over the seams. Leaks from electrolytic corrosion are forestalled by attaching anodes to the mains; these anodes corrode instead of the mains.

Even leak-proof plastic tubes are available to fit like sleeves inside the pipe. Another method of leak prevention seals the seams from inside the main. A small machine, directed by long wires, is sent crawling through the main. It feels its way to a joint, stops, cleans the area down to bright metal, and then coats the entire seam with a pliable rubber coating. When finished, it crawls on to the next joint like a busy little mole. Runaway gas pressures are prevented by the installation of a second stand-by valve in the intermediary lines.

Gas utilities maintain a program of constant inspection. In Philadelphia, for example, a force of 200 men makes more than 70,000 individual inspections every year of the 2,800 miles of mains. Radio-dispatched trucks, always on the street, can answer within minutes any report of a suspected gas leak. There are many false alarms—they turn out to be just bad sewer odors—but the trucks answer all calls. Systematic inspection of gas mains is in many areas made more difficult by the fact that methane, unlike the old manufactured gas, does not inhibit plant life. It is no longer possible to walk a gas line in an unbuilt-upon section, spotting leaks by the telltale blight of grass and weeds.

Yet, despite all precautions, gas explosions from leaking mains still occur. Not long ago, a drugstore in Long Island blew up. In Charleston, S.C., a café exploded and



killed two people. A canning factory in Indiana and a department store in Wisconsin both blew up with great loss of life. The bulletins of fire marshals tell why. At Merril, Wis., in July, 1960, a new building, housing a department store, suddenly exploded. The brick walls were blown outward and the roof collapsed into the interior. Ten people died.

No gas of any kind was used in the store, but investigation disclosed that a sealed-off service pipe leading up to the store had been broken in an area where a heavy bulldozer had been grading a parking space. The leaking gas crawled along the outside of the pipe toward the building, found a crack in the foundation, and filled the cellar.

Evidence of damage to a gas main has shown up in the street outside the Paramount Hotel in Boston. After an explosion in a 100-unit apartment house in Quebec in 1965, a broken gas main was found 15 feet away from the completely wrecked building. The main had been poorly laid by contractors. In the blast of a private dwelling in Pittsburgh, a gas pipe near the house had been damaged by an

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automobile only twenty-two hours earlier. A church in Washington, D.C., blew up early this year—someone forgot to cap a service pipe that led up to the building.

Damage to gas mains has become the greatest headache of the gas utilities. (Carelessness, incidentally, may be the prime cause in the bursting of that big pipe in Louisiana, and not a defect originally in the metal. According to a news report, investigators have disclosed that soda pop spilled on the pipe by workers may have started corrosion.)

With the growth of distribution mains in our cities and suburbs from 113,700 miles in 1945 to 204,700 miles in 1964, the amount of pipe vulnerable to carelessness or accident has almost doubled. The American Gas Association is aware of this increased danger and distributes to contractors great quantities of a booklet, "Before You Dig, Call." They hope that contractors will get in touch with local gas companies for advice before opening up a sidewalk or digging a trench.

150th anniversary of the birth of the industry in Baltimore. Today, 37.4 million customers in the United States use 120 billion therms of gas, and spend $7.4 billion for the privilege. The industry looks forward to 1975 when the present 748,000 miles of combined transmission and distribution pipes will have grown to 1 million, and the present 125 million gas appliances in use will have grown to 200 million. The companies don't want this trend checked by adverse publicity. They want to cover the country with their "total energy" package—a small gas-fed turbine in each home to provide house heat, cooking heat, air conditioning and electricity at a cost to the consumer lower than these items can be obtained separately. (See "The Big Blackout: Whooping Cranes & Power Failures" by Lawrence J. Hollander, *The Nation*, January 10.)

But unless there is some change in the nature of man, explosions caused by accidents to gas mains will continue to occur. Somewhere soon a heavy bulldozer will unknowingly rupture a main; a contractor working with gas pipe will forget a safety precaution. The gas will begin to leak, and the fuse of another time bomb will start ticking.

Gas is as safe as you make it. You can say it is safer, for instance, than electricity, if you want to go by numbers. In the United States each year there are five to six times more fires due to bad electrical wiring than to faulty gas connections. What makes gas accidents so terrible is the overwhelming nature of the accident—tremendous noise, complete buildings blown skyward, great loss of life. As one fire marshal said: "Fires you can fight, but how can you fight an explosion? It is over when it happens."

An explosion of another type is now being prepared in Washington. The recent treatment given the auto industry by a lawyer turned author is being made ready for the gas industry. Ralph Nader, according to news dispatches, has been lecturing to engineers on the need for higher standards of safety in the construction and maintenance of transcontinental pipe lines. Claims have been made that many lines are constructed of pipes whose wall thicknesses cannot withstand the great pressures. An engineer from the Labor Department is reported to be working with Mr. Nader. The Labor Department is also believed to be interested because of the high number of workingmen injured each year at the test sites and at the pumping stations. Thirty-five gas company employees were killed and 135 injured from 1950 to 1965.

The gas companies are celebrating the year 1966 as the

There's one good thing in the statistics. Suicide by gas inhalation is way down. Natural gas does not contain the up-to-30 per cent deadly carbon monoxide found in manufactured gas. All you can get these days by putting your head in the oven is nausea or a headache—or, if someone should ring the bell: BAM!

NOTE: Two weeks after the above was written, at 11:59 A.M. on August 23, the office building of the Phelps-Dodge Corporation at Fort Wayne, Ind., blew up. The explosion wrecked the two-story brick and steel-girder structure; it killed five people and injured twenty-five others. Fortunately, 140 other employees were out for lunch.

The cause of the explosion was natural gas. This has been ascertained by the Fort Wayne Fire Department. Gas had been smelled earlier in the morning by Phelps-Dodge employees, but not reported to the gas company. A private contractor was connecting a service line to the building, and the "bleeding off" of the line (to rid it of air and debris) was believed to cause the odor. However, not enough gas escaped in that procedure to produce the blast. The cause of the leak, and its location, have not been determined as yet, but the gas utility has been absolved of responsibility.

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EDUCATION: THE BAITED TRAP

MICHAEL CHIAPPETTA

Mr. Chiappetta is chairman of the Department of International and Comparative Education at Indiana University. He is the author of the chapter on Latin America in Comparative Education, *edited by Claude Eggertsen, to be published by University of Michigan Press.*

Now and again, but ever more frequently, someone comes forward in a developing country to warn that foreign aid has turned out to be a modern form of colonialism—cultural, capital or technical colonialism. The result of such assistance, so the complaint goes, is a homogenized Western technology. Factories are factories, in Lima, Bangkok or Nairobi. Supermarkets are supermarkets, in Bogotá, Lagos or Kingston.

And why should there not be clean, efficient, productive factories? What's wrong with airy, well-stocked, reasonable merchandising? Monotony. Cultural monotony; behavioral monotony; aspirational monotony. The developing countries, so the complaint goes, purchase good health and more goods, both seemingly desirable, at the uniform going price: Western behavior, Western values, Western culture. If you want to sense also the flavor of anti-Americanism, read "U.S." for "Western."

In Latin America, where many proud protagonists of Iberian or *criolla* culture are to be found, there is great awareness of, if not protest against, the new Yankee colonialism. My purpose here is not to defend or attack the givers or the receivers in this exchange. However, "cultural homogenization" *is* occurring; it is U.S. in origin and direction; and it is making itself felt at an accelerated rate. This short essay has three purposes: to explain the process of homogenization; to challenge Latin American leaders to wage cultural battle against it; and to predict failure to reverse the process.

The status of education in Latin America reflects most vividly the homogenization process. The recent entry of OECD (The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, a European body heavily influenced by the United States) into the counsels of Latin American governments testifies to the success of alien penetration. Educational planning based primarily on manpower requirements to staff rapidly industrializing societies is forcing the imitation of U.S. technical secondary and professional higher education. Schools of engineering and applied technology are fed by increasingly technical and scientific secondary schools. Shortly, the new generation of high school and university graduates will take their place in Latin American industry. Stanford- or Chicago-trained managers will guide the economic machinery of our modernizing neighbors. The point of all this is that engineers and managers look startlingly alike, in Santiago, Rio or New York. They are the new breed of international men. A well-trained Argentine could easily step into a corporate management job in Boston or San Francisco. These people are interchangeable because the system in which they work is universal.

I do not maintain that external penetration of technical and professional education is equivalent to a take-over of the entire educational machinery. It is true, however, that economic development requires specific educational outcomes which may deflect the system from other functions. Further, economic development puts demands on political and social institutions which may be inconsistent with cultural traditions and values. My argument is that economic development exerts a kind of determinism on all aspects of a culture, especially if its demands guide educational policy. Latin American education is, slowly in some sectors and rapidly in others, becoming more American and less Latin.

How can that be? How can the educational structure and content of one society be transferred almost intact to another? Presumably, an educational system reflects and serves the society in which it resides, and the goals of the



system are derived from the society that surrounds it. Certainly no one would argue that Latin American societies are like the mid-20th-century United States. Can it be that economic development is so powerful an influence that all social institutions must bend to its pattern? Can it be that, starting from such diverse backgrounds, Latin America and the United States are converging fast toward a homogenized culture? Does not the weight of several hundred years drag against the changes being swiftly impressed upon many Latin American institutions and practices, especially on Latin American technical and higher education?

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The answer to these question lies in two vacuums. The history of education in Latin America may not be as glorious as it is long. The present state of affairs has been described as difficult, disastrous, even catastrophic. The failure of Latin American countries to provide minimal education for their masses and quality education for their elites is well documented by the states themselves and the regional organization, the OAS.

In most of Latin America the vast majority of people are not reached by the educational systems. Something like one-fifth of the people finish elementary school, much less than 10 per cent get into secondary schools, and a much smaller percentage reach higher education. One can conclude that Latin American culture has not been created by and is not now being maintained through formal education. From the point of view of the masses of Latin America, therefore, there has been an educational vacuum.

If there has been a vacuum in mass education, what of the elites? In spite of the long history of universities in Latin America, they have not distinguished themselves or their products. In contrast to such institutions in Europe and the United States, few Latin American universities can lay claim to excellence in any field. Where are the renowned faculties of medicine, law, education, philosophy, even theology? In sum, Latin American education at its highest reaches has not fulfilled its mission, the training of an elite, the inculcation of the values and attitudes, the behavior and outlook that would give a culture its identification and distinction. Latin Americans themselves, especially their elites, have given and continue to give proof of this failure through their preference of European and United States universities for their sons and daughters. That is the second educational vacuum.

It is not surprising, then, that transplantations from abroad have found much space for growing in Latin America. One interesting aspect of the transplantation is that it is occurring from the top down rather than from the bottom up. North American forms are much more visible at the university level than at the elementary level of instruction. The result is that strengthened universities cannot count on a continuous flow of good students coming up from the elementary and secondary foundations. The system seems to be without roots.

If importation did not occur there still would have to be some formidable changes in educational organization and practice in order to serve the modernization needs of the region. Latin America faces revolutionary changes in its social, economic, political and cultural institutions. The crucial question is how and what will it choose.

Given the default of past and existing educational systems, what are the possibilities of educational change in the region? The course of events in the technical and professional fields is carrying Latin America rapidly toward the corporate, technical and professional structure of the United States and Europe; those portions of education which most directly supply technical and professional personnel, the universities and the institutes, are disturbing imitations of their United States and European models. This situation has led some people to think of Latin America as a complex of nations fifty or a hundred years behind the United States. It is precisely this point that Latin America should contest. Is Latin America a young, developing United States? Is it on the same development road? Aren't there any alternate routes, even to the same destination? Aren't there any other destinations, equally desirable, and as readily attainable?



That's the challenge. Latin American leaders, of industry, commerce, culture, education, find themselves in one of those famous "crucial moments of history." Latin America can become, if it is not already, the passive receptacle of a foreign aid which will impress a mold of Western homogeneity on the Indo-Hispanic clay. On the other hand, does not Latin America have any options in the matter? Must leaders rush headlong down the road to urbanization and "modernization" in spite of danger signs aloft in Los Angeles and New York? Is not this the time for Latin thinkers and writers to conjure their own utopias, to declare their "manifest destinies" in some independence from Europe and the United States? Certainly the expanse of land and its resources, the variety of cultural streams, the creativity of an imaginative people should produce some blueprints not to be found in Washington or Moscow.

This is not a plea to go back to nature, nor a polemic *against* Yankee or European culture. Neither is it a tirade against modernization, cars, medicines, T.V. It is a plea *for* a careful study of the society of the future, a study of the human relations that will obtain, the values to be recognized,

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the quality of life of tomorrow. It is a challenge to the leaders of Latin America to set a course such that Latin America doesn't just disappear in the anonymity of a universal tomorrow. Latin America can choose to preserve some of its Hispanic or Indo-American cultures. Or if it doesn't want to preserve anything, it can invent new forms for itself.

Educational expansion without serious examination of cultural and humanistic factors will produce and reinforce the economic pattern and structure of the United States and Western Europe. Technically competent people will flow from the more efficient systems to guarantee the process. I see no reason to believe that a protest against the development current in Latin America would be more effective ten years from now. On the contrary, time is on the side of the homogenizers.

Finally, I do not presume to warn anybody, especially since I am not a Latin American, but I can predict. And I predict that the United States and European programs of assistance to Latin America will be successful. Latin American economic development already shows signs of taking off. In the midst of discomfiting symptoms of tension I foresee staggeringly great, almost unimagined economic growth. I also foresee the homogenization. Cities are cities. Factories are factories. Supermarkets are supermarkets. It would take political, perhaps even religious bravery to stand before the juggernaut. To complicate matters, the alternatives are not at all clear. It is obvious that economic development à la Washington, D.C., means lots of goods, highways, cars, movies, TV, medicine, food; and all of those look terribly attractive to hungry and sick people. The options are not clear, partly because they have not been sought. In this uneven choice it is no wonder that economic development continues, and as it does it compresses other aspects of society into its mold.

In the last third of the 20th century I hold out two hopes for escaping an Orwellian future. The first hope is in a not well founded faith in the imagination and creativity of man; the second is that individualized development may be realized *not* through work in the developing countries but by an awakening in the developed countries to some fundamental questions about the Great Society of tomorrow. New thoughts about urbanization, human relations, computerized work, beautification, use of leisure time, may transform modern societies soon enough to make the exchange with Latin America open, if not reciprocal.

LETTERS *(continued from page 298)*

he likes it or not. . . . It was precisely Mr. Bellow's novels that encouraged me to think that there are points of agreement between us: ending the cold war; deepening the understanding between intellectuals of West and East. Therefore I tried to point out how difficult it is for Western intellectuals to know something about our Eastern experiences during the last twenty years. It was equally difficult for Eastern (and perhaps some Western) writers to understand why Mr. Bellow chose an international meeting to attack America's "subculture of literary intellectuals," a wholly internal matter. . . . I perfectly agree with Mr. Bellow also that I "appropriated his speech for purposes of my own." I pressed my purpose in taking part in the International P.E.N. Congress and in writing on East-West meetings of intellectuals by quoting the summing up of Arthur Miller at the close of the P.E.N. Congress: "You and I should emphasize what is similar and isolate what separates us." I am sorry that I was wrong in supposing that these are not only my own purposes but also those of the distinguished author of *Herzog*.

Iván Boldizsár

new kind of witness

Brooklyn, N.Y.

DEAR SIRS: Frank Donner's article ["HUAC: From Pillory to Farce," Sept. 5] about our confrontation with HUAC, while favorable to our style of demolishing the committee, misses or distorts the principal point of the hearings. Mr. Donner reports the "overnight" emergence of a "new kind of witness," who instead of cringing before the un-Americans "boils over with talk . . . attacks the committee, its premises and its claimed legislative subject matter. . . ." The tactic of militantly testifying before HUAC, of turning the hearing into its opposite by accusing the accuser, had been developed by the Progressive Labor Party (five of the six witnesses who testified were PLP members) at two previous HUAC investigations, after the 1963 and 1964 student trips to Cuba. It didn't spring up "overnight." This tactic flowed from our general line of openly and proudly advocating communism and putting forward the necessity of Socialist revolution in the United States, as opposed to the reformist and civil-libertarian stance of the Communist Party.

More important, our testimony was not primarily aimed at attacking the committee, as Mr. Donner implies. Our principal thrust was against the war in Vietnam, the imperialist system responsible for that war, and the Johnson Administration and the entire U. S. Government responsible to that system. The press correctly reported as central our statements about the war being unjust and against the interests of the American people. We felt that attacking HUAC was secondary because HUAC is secondary; in this case it was merely being used as one of several government tools designed to split the anti-war movement.

Rick Rhoads, President
CCNY Progressive Labor Club

morality is the law

Mesquite, Tex.

DEAR SIRS: "Christianity" is much esteemed in our society, but morality has been against the law from the time of Christ. Only the method of punishment has changed from throwing the moralists to the lions to sentencing them to years of hard labor and permanent disgrace in the eyes of self-styled Christians. . . . A man must never take seriously such Christian teachings as "Thou Shalt Not Kill" or "Love Thine Enemies" lest he be unable to revise his thinking at age 19, when killing becomes praiseworthy and hate is a virtue.

Henry Thoreau, a moralist, was jailed for failure to pay taxes to a government that condoned slavery. He was also guilty of saying such impractical, inflammatory things as: "The law will never make men free; it is men who must make the law free," and "It is the duty of the citizen to uphold the law when the government breaks it. . . ."

Mrs. Lee Dresh

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

T. S. Eliot: The Poet As Critic

TO CRITICIZE THE CRITIC AND OTHER WRITINGS. *By T. S. Eliot. Farrar, Straus & Giroux. 189 pp. $4.95.*

FREDERICK J. HOFFMAN
Mr. Hoffman holds the chair of Distinguished Professor of English at the University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee. His most recent book is The Mortal No: Death and the Modern Imagination *(Princeton).*

To have a book like this in one's hands is like revisiting a favorite cousin after several decades. Not only has the cousin grown old beyond belief but he is also a *memento mori* to one's self. In this case, *literally* so, since Eliot has died, having outlived his reputation by some years.

There were times when Eliot's word as critic was taken almost as oracular, as though a man who wrote *such* poetry could not fail in the slightest as a critic. The poetry remains (though almost the whole of it had been published by 1941); and, while our commitment to it has diminished from the 100 per cent of the forties and fifties, to a more modest 75 per cent (Stevens grows as Eliot diminishes, for reasons that it is beyond the scope of this essay to give), the initial enthusiasm for the Eliot of 1915-40 has somehow been justified and need cause no embarrassment.

What of Eliot as a critic? Of course, one needs to ask, which Eliot? Or, the Eliot of what time in his career? For he lived a long time, and his writing endured many changes. The final conservative, even fussily, mildly humorous old gentleman who can dilate upon the meaning of *runcibles* in *Alice in Wonderland* and elsewhere, is here; but strangely, so is the earliest Eliot (earliest, that is, aside from his reviews of philosophical work). His widow explains that the "Ezra Pound: His Metric and Poetry" and "Reflections on *Vers Libre*" (both of them dated 1917) are included in this posthumous volume "in response to many requests." It is with these two that we need to begin. The little booklet on Pound, published by the then very young Alfred Knopf in November, 1917, is an earnest of Eliot's early position. He was applauding the Pound of the early volumes, of the vivid discussions of Provençal and Chinese and French poetry (a selected group in each case), the Pound who had so recently started writing the *Cantos* that Eliot is able to mention them only in the last paragraph.

Above all, Eliot was discussing Pound the Imagist, the Vorticist, with whom he genuinely shared interests and convictions. These two words suggest the artist as an impersonal (but, somehow also perceptive, sensitive) agent, by means of which the image is communicated, so that, as he said in his famous essay on *Hamlet,* if a system, a structure, of images be somehow put together, "when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked."

This is the Eliot of an assumed "objective," "impersonal" criticism. "Honest criticism and sensitive appreciation," he said in another famous essay ("Tradition and the Individual Talent," 1919), "are directed not upon the poet but upon the poetry." It was in that essay that he compared the mind of the poet to the catalyst, in an analogy that became so popular that he had to joke about it later, to shrug it off, as indeed he does in the title essay of this volume. The *ambience* of this analogy, however, was *not* to be ignored in these early years. Both Eliot and Pound were striving for what might be called a perfect aesthetic *stasis,* a formulation of the aesthetic moment that could stand up to the "accuracies" of science. They were not the only ones inclined to mistrust the fading romanticism of late 19th-century poetry and criticism. Criticism was engaged in an almost urgent search for the right, impersonal, nongenteel formulation. The only way in which the personality of the artist seemed permitted to demonstrate itself was in the areas of satire and irony.

Most of all, Pound and Eliot sought a justification of the poet-critic. They did not require that the poetry *affect* the criticism, though much was said by both about the taste of the poet, who would seek out the best and more unerringly find it than nonpoets. Eliot came close in 1923 to suggesting an "autotelic activity" in criticism, as though there were something automatic in the technicalities, both of its process and its results. He meant something else, of course: that the object of creation is "autotelic," and that criticism is *about* that object. This assertion implies that criticism and creation are and will remain separate, but also that the critic has no more right to intrude his personality than the artist has to assert his. The net result is a stringent, limited, technical, above all an *objective* criticism.

Northrop Frye said, in *Anatomy of Criticism,* that when a poet writes a critical essay, it must be judged not as a poem but as a work separate from his poetry. The criticism does not, or ought not borrow prestige from the fact that a poet has written it. This is true; or, if it isn't, much criticism of literature and art must be discarded. In fact, the most substantial work in criticism has been done by persons who have taken the act of criticism seriously, and who have the knowledges that enable them to relate literature to many other elements of a culture. Gradually, in the 1920s, Eliot grew to realize that this is generally true; and he also began to withdraw his rather austere notion of the poet's mind as catalyst. The real problem was the question of belief. The very issues with which Prof. J. Hillis Miller has recently been engaged (in a strange, though impressive book called *Poets of Reality*) were available to the Eliot of the 1920s: the sense of pure, essential reality residing in the image, the spatial dimension (as distinguished from the *depth,* the intensity and the emotional quality) of aesthetic reality. Miller discusses these as the surrogates of theological reality, and of course he includes Eliot among those who helped establish the point of view. But Eliot was the last person to satisfy himself with a reality which excluded a superintending God, and he objected also to a divinity as principle, derived intellectually.

So that his principal issue in the years following the assertions I have been discussing were really concerned with *belief.* At the moment, Eliot was not especially preoccupied with doctrine but simply with the matter of reinserting the emotional powers and values of belief (or, commitment) into the discussion of poetry. In his principal essay on "Dante" (1929), he included the famous debate with I. A. Richards (who in his pamphlet, "Science and Poetry," 1926, had stirred people like Eliot to examine some of the implications of what they had said). The long footnote at the end of Part II has these remarkable concessions: "Actually, one probably has more pleasure in the poetry when one shares the beliefs of the poet. On the other hand there is a distinct pleasure in enjoying poetry as poetry when

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one does *not* share the beliefs, analogous to the pleasure of 'mastering' other men's philosophical systems." In other words, Eliot began to introduce "irrelevancies," to allow personal choices, in the experience of "enjoying" poetry.

From that point forward, Eliot's criticism, as his poetry, moved further and further toward not only admitting belief into the emotional experience of art but explicitly signifying the doctrinaire terms according to which belief may be specified. The remark made in his *Essays Ancient and Modern* (1935), which Paul Elmer More was so delighted to find, should surely have surprised no one who had been aware of this trend: "The 'greatness' of literature cannot be determined solely by literary standards; though we must remember that whether it is literature or not can be determined solely by literary standards." The days of the "catalyst" analogy and of the stern warnings about the limits of criticism seem far away indeed; and they were to seem even more remote in the series of short books produced in the thirties and forties: *After Strange Gods* (lectures at the University of Virginia, published in 1934), in which the unwary first discovered the conservative Eliot, despite the great poet's disclaimer in the Preface, that he was not serving as a critic but as a kind of intellectual historian; *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture* (1939), in which the word *definition* meant *limiting*; and *The Idea of a Christian Society* (1939), concerned largely with Conservative politics and religion.

With the exception of the two essays rescued from the oblivion of almost a half century, the current volume simply carries on the tradition of these short volumes. Perhaps, in consequence, they are dull; but their dullness is not solely a result of point of view. The lectures given at the University of Chicago in 1950 and 1951 seem to me to demonstrate an ordinary mind that has lost much of its vigor and is in any case more the amateur than ever. Only the title essay, given at the University of Leeds in 1961, seems worthy among the recent pieces of having been "collected" in book form. Here he discusses kinds and types of critics, but often, again, in a coy "personal" way, as though the subject were really just "among friends." The essay is interesting as a memoir of the man looking at his career as critic: apparently, "it is my earlier essays which have made the deeper impression," he says, and he attributes this fact to "the dogmatism of youth," and—more important—in those days "I was implicitly defending the sort of poetry that I and my friends wrote."

In these remarks there are several implications for the history of modern criticism. Both Eliot and Pound were aware of themselves as having broken new ground in a very significant way in the years from 1908 to 1925 (the first date marks the publication of Pound's first book of poems; the second simply suggests the beginning of a later phase, in which opinions generally take the place of vigorous pronunciamentos). In Eliot's case, more so than Pound's, there is a retreat into a number of traditions, to which he yielded without doing very much to qualify the nature of them. This, among other reasons, explains the startling differences between the last two of the essays published in this volume and the rest of them. Surely, Eliot on education can have only an antiquarian interest; as, indeed, can many other aspects of this volume. But we do not leave this collection, however much it fails in terms of the requirements of a unified book, without being reminded that Eliot was at one time—and for a long while and for his own vital reasons—at the forefront of modern criticism. The effects are still radically seen by us, even though few of Eliot's later public statements suggest that he was fully aware of them.

Eliot As Playwright

CAROL H. SMITH

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To the theatregoer accustomed to the conventions of modern drama, the plays of T. S. Eliot are more likely to baffle than to inspire. Not only do Eliot's plays refuse to conform to today's dramatic modes but each play is theatrically different from the others. Moreover, a play which begins in one dramatic mood typically turns into another before one's eyes. The historical pageantry of *Murder in the Cathedral* is disrupted by jazz meters and the rhythms of 20th-century polemic; in other plays, occult and mystical touches intrude into the world of high comedy or Wildean farce. Eliot is quite capable of including in the same play the most sensitive lyric passages and wisecracking representatives of divinity or parodies of sacramental rites.

Behind these practical difficulties lies the more significant and difficult question of the relationship of Eliot's plays to his poetry. Are his plays to be taken as serious expressions in another medium of the religious position Eliot has presented in his nondramatic verse, or are they a thing apart, separate creations in a separate vein? Early critics of the plays generally expressed the view that Eliot was either writing plays with his left hand while concentrating his major efforts on lyric poetry, or that he was consciously trying to "take in" his audience. Today, in the light of the number of Eliot's plays and the fact that he spent the major part of his mature career in their composition, the seriousness of his intentions can hardly be doubted.

Eliot's interest in drama dates back to the beginnings of his career. His critical essays on Elizabethan and Jacobean dramatists, his use of the dramatic monologue in some of his best-known early poems ("The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock," "Portrait of a Lady," "Gerontion"), and the dramatic contrast of episodes in *The Waste Land* all testify to what Edmund Wilson called "the dramatic character of his imagination." But there is a further aspect of Eliot's interest in drama that is often overlooked, although it is a thread woven throughout his early essays and critical pronouncements—his interest in what he calls, in the title of an early essay, "The Possibility of a Poetic Drama."

Eliot's desire for a poetic drama for the 20th century is part of an interest shared by many of his generation: there is an unwritten chapter in the intellectual history of the period to be constructed out of the multiple threads of influence drawn from Henry James's and James Joyce's elevation of the dramatic method in fiction and the essentially dramatic idea of the mask with which Yeats transformed modern poetry. But in Eliot's case the implications of the dramatic form went far beyond aesthetic concerns, and was integrally connected with the religious and philosophical position which he was in the process of formulating. Eliot's much publicized announcement in 1928 that he had become an Anglo-Catholic reflected his religious shift from despair at the disorder of the natural world to acceptance of a supernatural order which transcends and harmonizes the world's apparent chaos. Just as a religious interpretation of existence was needed to order the world of nature and of man, so art, he felt, required a form which could impose order and meaning on experience. The form which Eliot came to see as most perfectly ordered and most complete as a microcosmic creation of experience was drama.

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The drama offered the artist the chance to play God more completely yet less obviously than any other literary form, and it can be assumed that Joyce's famous comparison of the artist to the God of creation who pares his fingernails while his creatures play out their parts was not lost on Eliot. Moreover, Eliot had followed with deep interest the work of J. G. Frazer in *The Golden Bough* and the Cambridge school of classical anthropologists in their assertions of the ritual origin of drama. He found in the death and resurrection pattern, which Frazer and his followers discerned at the heart of both Greek tragedy and comedy, a theme which was perfectly suited to both his aesthetic and religious demands. What is found in all of his plays is his own variant of the resurrection pattern: the painful acceptance of God's controlling presence and light by an inhabitant of the natural world of darkness and disorder.

But for drama to provide the aesthetic ordering of experience which Eliot considered necessary, it had to be conceived as a unity of elements, a vehicle which could harmonize the seeming contraries of the natural and supernatural by its language as well as its form; it had to be, in other words, poetic in conception. His consistent criticism of dramatic realism can be understood in the light of his view that drama should be rescued from the secularism and "materialism" of the prose realists. One of Eliot's fullest statements of his position can be seen in *Four Elizabethan Dramatists* (1924):

> The great vice of English drama from Kyd to Galsworthy has been that its aim of realism was unlimited. [S]ince Kyd . . . there has been no form to arrest, so to speak, the flow of spirit at any particular point before it expands and ends its course in the desert of exact likeness to the reality which is perceived by the most commonplace mind. . . . In a play of Aeschylus, we do not find that certain passages are literature and other passages drama; every style of utterance in the play bears a relation to the whole and because of this relation is dramatic in itself. The imitation of life is circumscribed, and the approaches to ordinary speech and withdrawals from ordinary speech are not without relation and effect upon each other. It is essential that a work of art should be self-consistent, that an artist should consciously or unconsciously draw a circle beyond which he does not trespass: on the one hand actual life is always the material, and on the other hand an abstraction from actual life is a necessary condition to the creation of the work of art.

Eliot's desire, then, was for a dramatic form which would make drama conform to the criterion of all art: the harmonious relationship of the parts to the whole. He insisted that such a relationship could be achieved only by the abstraction of reality, a standard which realism could never achieve. Poetry, on the other hand, is by its nature an artistic abstraction of life; by the use of the language of metaphor and the rhythmic patterning of language, the poet draws the parts and the whole into a unified relationship which could never be confused with the "desert of exact likeness" to reality. Eliot's ideal of dramatic form was a work which would re-create in its theme, its form and its language the harmony which explained the untidy surface of life. The dramatist's mission was thus both artistic and religious, and it was envisioned as a process of transformation.

Eliot's pursuit of this concept of form can be seen in all his plays from his first dramatic experiment, the two scenes of *Sweeney Agonistes,* to his last play, *The Elder Statesman.* In *Sweeney Agonistes,* written from 1924 to 1926, Eliot used jazz rhythms and a "furnished-flat" atmosphere to convey the spiritual barrenness and corruption of the natural world. The scenes are ingeniously constructed as a restatement in modern terms of the quotations which stand as the work's epigraphs—the line in Aeschylus' *Choephoroi* which marks Orestes' first awareness of the Furies, and the instruction by St. John of the Cross to the novice who seeks to pass through the dark night of the senses: "Hence the soul cannot be possessed of the divine union, until it has divested itself of the love of created beings." The climax of the piece is Sweeney's description of a grisly murder where the girl's body was dissolved in a lysol bath and where the murderer, perhaps Sweeney himself, experiences the Christian paradox as a state where "death is life and life is death." In the symbolism of the murderer who carries out the divestment of the love of created beings in the most grotesque terms, the emphasis is upon the horror and pain involved in the discovery of the world of the spirit, and upon the in-

WALK IN WOODS

St. Vincent's

I go looking for Strephon and Chlora:
drawing my ribs tight,
plunging my face in dark
branchy places hinted by
gossipy sparrow shocking
jay to raspy declamation.
November's bare for discovery,
air blood temperature,
woods untidy as mind
—tomorrow will be time
to put the house in order—
today is heady, keen,
all within itself: I
call on spice of fallen
leaf, rain smell, moss feel,
squashed redberry, wormwood
and bitten bark, obbligato
of a late grasshopper.
Here's continent for lovers,
plushland of Eros,
room for 'this endless
shadow, this manshape'.
Errors of dream
cancel
in prime matter of woodlight
slanting into man's way.
Give me a big light, Eros,
I'm looking for my cousins,
milkwhite and nutbrown,
inevitable as flesh.
From searching, breath comes heavy,
I will hold my throat,
loiter beside this old nest
to be robined next year:
check a cavern of self
unbothered by existence
for essence of woods.
Sudden rainpoints
fine as sorrow touch
my scalp, rinsing brain
and frozen stars
of relic dandelion fluff
I find in my gathered hand.
If I blow hard
I can star woods to
brightness on my own terms,
giving up all the pieces
broken as looked-in mirror.
But where is my ghostly father
who led me
in his alb and snow chasuble
to this leafy confessional?
I could confess
bless me father for I have wasted
light under honest trees,
by nettles hard and brittle,
near unblown milkweed.
Call Adonai, white
father, he leans on your eye
and on ghosts of lovers
I drape with wet tendril.
He may know the difference
if I'm back.

RAYMOND ROSELIEP

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ability of the newly awakened soul to communicate his awareness to others. In *Sweeney Agonistes,* the price of awareness is very great, and the sacrifice of human love demanded by the spiritual world is forcefully symbolized by the tragic duty of Orestes who must commit matricide in order to avenge patricide.

In *Murder in the Cathedral* (1935), Eliot attempted a treatment of the theme of spiritual sacrifice in more timeless terms. While the portrayal of the martyrdom of St. Thomas of Canterbury is the spiritual center of the play, the role of the chorus of women of Canterbury is of equal importance. In *Sweeney Agonistes,* Eliot had used a jazz version of the Greek chorus, but here the chorus serves a more integral function by showing that God's choice of His martyr is not a private affair between the Deity and the saint, but an event with consequences in the lives of all men. The women are led through the painful process of awareness to the acknowledgment of their share in both the martyr's suffering and his glory. While the drama uses many of the ritual features, it has a closer and more appropriate source for the resurrection theme in the Passion and Resurrection of Christ; Thomas himself makes the parallel between the martyr and Christ quite explicit in his Christmas sermon.

In Eliot's careful avoidance of all but the most necessary historical references, the stylized quality of the characterizations, and the single-minded concentration on the eternal nature of the struggle between man's pride and God's will, he was clearly trying to lift the particular to a universal plane and thereby make the play of contemporary relevance to his audience. The introduction of the Knights's jazz chant in the murder scene and their direct address to the audience in the language of contemporary political debate were clearly intended to lead to the rejection of their view that the martyr be judged of "unsound mind." Despite the play's theatrical success, however, Eliot labeled it a "dead end," for he came to feel that its historical situation had caused his failure to convince audiences of the need for revision of their secular point of view.

So, in *The Family Reunion* (1939), he returned to a contemporary setting, but he replaced the furnished flat of *Sweeney Agonistes* with the English country house. Many features of the play, however, suggest that it is a reworking of the earlier piece. The situation is again based on a contemporary treatment of the Orestes story, even to the re-use of the cry of Orestes, the tale of a murdered wife, and the pursuing Furies. Again Eliot uses the method of turning a situation normally viewed in secular terms into one charged with religious meaning. Into the world of Wishwood where the Monchensey family has gathered to celebrate the dowager mother's birthday, the playwright introduces Harry, the son of the family, distraught, guilt-ridden and a possible "murder suspect." But gradually the Agatha Christie atmosphere, complete with police inspector, is translated into ritual terms as the guilt-laden Harry is led to a recognition of his election by God. In the symbols of the play, Harry rejects the obligation of the human family (thus, like Orestes, causing his mother's death) in favor of union with God.

In *The Cocktail Party* (1949) and *The Confidential Clerk* (1953), Eliot turned to comedy, a time-honored instrument for the disruption of expectations, in his attempt to reveal the divine plan behind appearances. His method in both plays was to create a surface atmosphere unlikely to suggest religious attitudes and then to bring the audience step by step to the awareness of the spiritual analogues in the situation. Eliot saw the possibility of exploiting for religious purposes the orderly and stylized comic world and the traditional comic resolution of all discord in the happy ending.

The Cocktail Party is in many ways Eliot's most ingenious play; by his own standards, his most successful one. The Alcestis myth, the story of Heracles' rescue of Alcestis from the realm of the dead, is re-created as a comedy of manners. Eliot exploits all the comic possibilities of misguided love affairs, double triangles, and cocktail party repartee, but behind the comic treatment of the several love affairs, the playwright examines the Christian assumption that the human condition without grace leads to misguided concepts of the meaning of love. With the help of Sir Henry, Eliot's priest-doctor who represents Heracles, Lavinia is rescued from the spiritual death of self-love and returned to her husband and her hearth; Sir Henry also rescues Celia from the secular world and sends her on the journey toward sainthood and martyrdom. The play marks a significant new emphasis in Eliot's attitude toward salvation; for the first time in his plays both the Affirmative Way of love in Christian marriage and the Negative Way of St. John of the Cross are presented as equally valid approaches to God.

In *The Confidential Clerk,* Eliot explored the religious possibilities in the favorite theme of farce, the foundling child's search for his true parentage. With a situation drawn from the *Ion* of Euripides, but with a comic surface suggesting Oscar Wilde, the play presents Colby's search for his true father which

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ends with his discovery of his Father in Heaven. Through the transparent surface of the farce and the underlying seriousness of the analogies, Eliot was able to avoid the dramatic disruptions of the play's surface and instead create a comic fable which could be read on two levels at once.

In *The Elder Statesman* (1958), Eliot's last play, he dispensed with the idea of discrepancy between levels altogether and allowed the meaning of the source to determine the mood of the surface. Even the verse, which some critics have found indistinguishable from prose, can be seen on close analysis to be carefully constructed to approach the natural rhythms of speech, while poetically exploring the relationship between the modern situation and the ancient source. The play is modeled on Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*. Lord Claverton, like the aging Oedipus who finds peace through expiation, faces the ghosts of his past, and with the help of his daughter's love dies purified. Eliot's choice of *Oedipus at Colonus* for his source seems to suggest that he wished the play to present a final resolution of the theme of spiritual quest, for at the time of the first production of *The Family Reunion* Eliot had written to his director, E. Martin Browne, that "Harry's career needs to be completed by an *Orestes* or an *Oedipus at Colonus*." In its tone of acceptance and its emphasis on the saving power of love, his final play seems to be a fulfillment of that promise.

A Place of Resonance

THE MUSIC SCHOOL. *By John Updike. Alfred A. Knopf. 260 pp. $4.95.*

CHARLES T. SAMUELS
Mr. Samuels teaches English at Williams College. He has written for The Kenyon Review, The Yale Review, Commonweal *and other magazines.*

The Music School contains nearly all the stories John Updike has published in the past four years. As before, there are too many trifles; unfortunately, chronological arrangement places too many of them at the beginning of the book. Nevertheless, *The Music School* is Updike's best collection, with superior examples of every sort of story that he writes.

"Lifeguard" in *Pigeon Feathers* was a consideration of the ambiguities of secular life through the reverie of a divinity student who is earning tuition on the beach. With a contrapuntal technique that plays on its title, "The Music School" treats the same theme with greater poise. Though more audacious than the earlier tale, which managed to turn bathers into theological terms, this story does not mock its speaker's pain with a brazen virtuosity.

Other stories, formally less innovating, comprise Updike's clever portrayals of marital tension. Cleverness, however, is sometimes evasive here. As Updike showed in *Of the Farm*, a quarrel has its own rhythm. Artificially composed, the notes sound shriller than they need to be, frequently false. The short-story form, particularly as practiced in *The New Yorker*, forces Updike to impose structural neatness upon materials that seem authentic only when free from external restraint. So, in "Giving Blood," the precise oscillation of the Maples' love is cut short arbitrarily. In a restaurant where they go to share the moment of camaraderie, born while they donated blood, the husband finds he lacks money to pay for his affectionate invitation; and the wife, obviously punning, replies: "We'll both pay." Surfeited with cleverness, the reader now disdains the pun implicit in the whole story; what could have been a moving glimpse at familiar despair blinds us with a glossy surface to its underlying truth.

Two tales in *The Music School* manage to make slickness a virtue. "Avec La Bébé-Sitter" and "The Rescue" don't strain for outsize responses. The couples in them are either past the Maples' danger or their troubles are unreal. The first story is a sardonic anecdote about two people on the rocks who hope to cement their foundation by moving to Antibes. One afternoon while the wife is gone, the husband, manfully learning French from their baby-sitter-maid, blurts out the house's secret. Ironically, his confession creates an emotional order on these shifty Mediterranean sands which the family lacked back home. In the second story, a young woman who suspects her husband is unfaithful decides not to yield to disruptive anger. Faced with a fortuitous image of divorced self-righteousness, spread-eagled on an icy ski slope, she becomes certain that her husband must be innocent. Cleverness can capture only small ironies in human affairs, but it is the merit of both stories that their ironies precisely suit their treatment.

Updike's art is more polished in this volume than in his earlier collections, but *The Music School* would be a less resonant place were it not for one group of stories representing an advance in scope. One of these, Updike's best story to date, is another of those doctrinal debates which he presents as ordinary encounters, like Hook and Conner discussing the nature of virtue in the poorhouse sitting room, or Rabbit and Eccles defining grace on the golf course. In "The Christian Roommates" the essential Updike meeting of pharisee and would-be saint occurs at Harvard, an institution designed to train adolescents—thus, a perfect setting for Updike's theme. Not even Salinger has created so touching a display of that mixture of fear and bravado with which the college student approaches an adult role. The background of "The Christian Roommates" is crowded with young souls fixed in brittle postures of self-defensiveness, like the homesick colored boy who warms himself in the unfamiliar New England cold with nightly blowing on a trumpet mouthpiece, or the witty roommates who mask their enmity by collaborating on improvised musical comedies at the expense of all outsiders.

Against this background, Updike presents the engagement of Orson Zeigler, lanky, Midwestern, athletic valedictorian, who has mapped out his future as town physician and pillar of society, with Hub Palamountain, maddeningly arrogant, vegetarian, boor and yogi. Each moment of their conflict is finely rendered. When Orson first enters the room which will become their battleground, Hub dazzles him with those personal details—divorced parents, unpopularity, conscientious objecting to the draft, and arcane religious zeal—which give Zeigler his first glimpse of depths hidden in his own life. In the midst of this recital, Hub accounts rather solemnly for his summer job as gluer in a plywood mill. "It's a kind of excessive introspection," he intones, "you've read *Hamlet*?" Fresh-scrubbed Orson feels his soul challenged. "Just *Macbeth* and *The Merchant of Venice*," he pleads.

Definitive as it is, their contention is never expressed in moments less natural than this one. In his best work, Updike infuses his story with meaning not by commenting on the action but by always finding the right gesture or word for his people so that their significance is the satisfying accumulation of all they have said or done. Thus, for the final impact of Hub's god-lust on Orson's shallow correctness, Updike finds the perfect measured fact: when the boy becomes the man he had envisioned, he carries "a kind of scar . . . without pain and without any clear memory of the amputation. . . . He never prays."

Though "The Christian Roommates" is typical, it suggests the author's willingness to break the essentially domestic walls of his universe, a willingness best realized in two other stories: "At a Bar

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in Charlotte Amalie" and "The Bulgarian Poetess." The first tale is a rigidly controlled description of events witnessed at a bar in the Virgin Islands. The tableau is formed by the slightest shift in the arrangement of its components: a prim schoolteacher who by entering the bar starts the story is subtly drawn into its languid corruption as a finale. Nothing much happens, but we know this bar down to the last cloying drop of rum with which its inhabitants assuage their aimlessness.

"The Bulgarian Poetess" is the volume's emotive triumph just as "The Christian Roommates" is its triumph in human understanding. There is little fulfilled love in Updike's fiction; he is too aware of its contingency. But "The Bulgarian Poetess" creates a moment of love which is all the more precious for being fugitive. Its hero is an American novelist whose best work is behind him and whose life has dried for want of affection. On a feckless red-taped journey to Bulgaria, he meets a fellow writer whose female grace and tenderness give him sustaining proof of what he has had to live without.

In the course of this story, Updike needs to provide some informed literary chatter for his writers and cultural hangers-on. What he makes them say is intrinsically interesting. How many of our writers can demonstrate a character's intelligence? How many can find the right words for two adolescents who are taking each other's measure? How many can describe the exact sensation of feeling blood drained from your arm or the gradations of shadow as the sky darkens?

Updike's range of experience is both common and confined; he avoids those upheavals in which many of us like to think we find our true reflection. Some readers will persist in finding him trivial; they will miss separable and obtrusive "ideas": even fervent admirers must admit that his situations are often too slight. But within the ordinary moments he selects, his precisely expressive language always embeds an insight authenticated by gesture, a truth extensively portrayed. No one has ever denied his skill. But we ought to remember that in art, skill is not a dispensable adjunct to seriousness; it *is* seriousness: proof that the artist esteems his craft, his subject, his readers. Updike's reverence for life won't disdain small moments and won't compromise itself with inflated or pretentious language. His seriousness is chastened by modesty, his nostalgia is both joyful and unillusioned, his precision is both linguistic and dramatic. Is there another new American novelist who gives such continuous proof of the power of art?

Mr. Keynes and His Age

THE AGE OF KEYNES. *By Robert Lekachman. Random House. 324 pp. $6.*
THE CARTHAGINIAN PEACE OR THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF MR. KEYNES. *By Etienne Mantoux. Introduction by Robert G. Colodny. University of Pittsburgh Press. 235 pp. $2.25 paper.*

JAMES F. BECKER
Mr. Becker is associate professor of economics at New York University. He has published in professional journals as well as in Studies on the Left *and* Columbia Forum.

In this high noon of Keynes's renown, hardly a man is to be found who can face the record of that economist's conquests and doubt their impressiveness. To the elusive goal of putting our affairs upon a rational footing, his economics is generally conceded to have made a decisive contribution.

Yet Keynes has not always been regarded as a foe of disorder and, despite the majority opinion, the case for his greatness is incomplete. It is likely to remain so despite the evidence contained in these two volumes if only because Lekachman is too uncritical of Keynes's life and times alike, while Mantoux's famous study, though valuable by reason of its critical acuteness, encompasses too small a range of its subject's work.

Lekachman begins his study where Mantoux, the excellent scholar and Free French soldier, killed in action in World War II, begins and ends, with Keynes's *Economic Consequences of the Peace* and its sequel, *A Revision of the Treaty*. Lekachman accepts without question Keynes's view that the intent of the Allied principals at Versailles was too punitive, the terms of the Treaty reprehensible by the standards of sound economic judgment, and the peace too "Carthaginian." Surely the passage of time has shown that strict justice demanded more from the Germany of World War I than the young Keynes realized. As Mantoux shows us in meticulous detail, the dimness of Keynes's foresight was in his early work matched by the superficiality of his analysis.

As one marvels at Mantoux's annihilation of Keynes's argument for a lenient settlement for Germany, one wonders whether, had that Keynes the maturity of, say, a Veblen, his imagination could have responded to the simple yet stringent conditions for German pacification that Veblen proposed in *The Nature of Peace*. Keynes's spiritual sympathies might then have run with the "tigers" of Versailles whose demands he so ridiculed, and the phrase "transfer problem" that he invented to summarize his brief for magnanimity in the matter of reparations payments from Germany might never have arisen to confuse our thinking. We have Mantoux to thank for clarifying the essential nature of this example of Keynesian semantics.

The problem of reparative transfers, of which economic metaphysicians still incline to make a good deal, consisted of two parts. The first referred to the possible movements of goods and services required to repair the harm done by the aggressor. Here, however, the dictates of justice conflicted under competitive capitalism with the needs of the domestic producers of the Allies who could see their home markets undercut by Germany's reparative exports, and their foreign markets shrunk by her economic dieting at home. Such prospects have been known to weaken even a strong merchant's taste for justice. Mantoux reveals how Keynes would have limited Allied demands so as, in effect, to forestall such embarrassments; for example, by grossly underestimating the capacity of the German economy for "real" repayment.

In its second phase, the transfer problem embraced the international exchanges of money and credit that are the accompaniment to material reparations. Here Keynes perceived the destabilizing effects on money exchanges of extraordinary financial transfers. He saw that by minimizing the volume of transfers of both real and monetary kinds, one would minimize the stress upon mechanisms of international trade and exchange. Keynes thought, of course, that he had described the rather close boundaries of a reasonable and just settlement; what he had

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actually described was a set of economic relationships that were not able to bear the weight of the demands of strict justice.

Though few of Keynes's more vengeful compatriots in business and finance saw the mercifulness to themselves of his reparations argument—as Boisguilbert long ago observed, the wealthy seldom know what is in their own best interest—his famous briefs did in fact support mainly the short-term, postwar needs of finance capital, which he so well understood. Indirectly, his argument served the long-term needs of German militarism, whose physical resources later went unchallenged because its social resources were strengthened by the Keynesian myth that injustice had been done at Versailles. That the basic rules of the game of transfers needed to be changed if justice were to be secured is the one possibility that Keynes refused to consider. We may conclude that his allegiance was to established rules and to the men who play by them, rather than to the needs of men in general and of justice in the abstract.

The thesis is not farfetched, though Lekachman fails to reach it, that throughout Keynes's career he restricted himself to the contemplation of possibilities for social adjustment that were consistent with the existing mores of trade and money and the power of those who live by them. So, in the twenties, while British officialdom struggled to re-establish the obsolete, prewar gold standard, Keynes sought to free these officials from their golden hamstrings, and to offer alternative guides for monetary actions along lines which had always been well within the administrative prerogative. Lekachman is right in saying that Keynes ". . . possessed a full measure of the intellectual's confidence in his capacity to produce alternative ideas," but he fails to see that the range of choice within which Keynes worked was always rather narrow. Mantoux was among the first to see that the narrowness had existed from the beginning.

The great consistency that one finds in Keynes's strategic objectives is to be found precisely in his recurring endeavor to reshape the processes of decision within the financial bureaus of government. No doubt Keynes believed—unquestionably he assumed—that intrastitial change would ultimately make for rationality within the social order at large upon which the bureaucracy so relentlessly impinges. Whether this vestige of a Victorian dream is itself rational is a question to which Keynes gave relatively little thought. History may yet name him the chief economist of the hope that dies hard.

Since publication in 1935 of *The General Theory* and the renaissance of its idea of effective demand, it has been difficult to see the importance of Keynes's persistent neglect of the main issue of the proper aim of social science. Because he never inquires whether the means to full employment in the short run are consistent with all else that is needed to insure in the long run the viability of the community (as he put it, "In the long run we are all dead"), and because he fails to relate full employment to other devices that promise to make our social life superior in time to what it now is, *The General Theory* promises to become the Bible of myopic bureaucrats. Thus Lekachman declares, without seeing the magnitude of the Keynesian defect:

> . . . it is possible to see at last that Keynesian economics is not conservative, liberal, or radical. The techniques of economic stimulation and stabilization are simply neutral administrative tools capable of distributing national income either more or less equitably, improving the bargaining position of either unions or employers, and increasing or decreasing the importance of the public sector of the economy.

How tools that produce such effects may be said to be "neutral" Lekachman does not explain, probably because it is inexplicable. Perhaps he meant to say that such tools would be neutral if men would refrain from using them, but he avoids that level of platitude. As the tools are now used, there is no neutrality in them if only because there are, and can be, no men who are outside of politics.

One may even doubt whether Keynes's economics is a social science at all. Social theorists of higher stature—Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, Locke, Smith, Marx—have in common their effort to discover theoretically the political and economic conditions for integrating all social classes into one going concern—nor is there anything in that noble enterprise that precludes a thorough consideration of short-run problems, as their works demonstrate. By this standard, Keynes's is a mediocre economics. Embracing the short-term possibilities for full employment that fall within the confines of a given establishment, his economics leaves the selection among these possibilities—and the evaluation (if any) of their ultimate consequences—to the whims of those who dominate when the decision is made. Some will excuse Keynes's neglect for reason of our desperation to cure by any means the unemployment that confronted us in the thirties. Desperation excuses nothing, however, because it is always the essence of the human condition.

The political versatility of the "new" Keynesian idea—like his earlier idea of injustice at Versailles—accounts for its contemporary power. With "effective demand" one can be economically "scientific," keep one's eye on the main chance,

PAIN

I

The woody fiber of the leaf; the stalk
With fingers spreading outward
Like an old vine-root, half-seen
In the dusty light, belonging
Half to sleep and half to knowledge.
Or is it a coat worn under the skin,
Wrapped closely around whatever lives?

II

When the sun went off against the windowpane,
Like firecrackers, my hands reached down
And touched your blurred life.
You moved inside yourself, fearing
For your words, and behind the silence
We touched each other with fingers
More than visible; practiced fingers,
Words made of the body, unlike pain
And yet filled with that strange blossom.

III

Shipwreck; the sides of the boat spread outward
Like petals; the columns of grey water
Lift up and dissolve; roofless temples,
Trees with foamy roots, desperate thoughts.

PAUL ZWEIG

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and retain intact one's essential prejudices. This is the economics for which many have longed since Gopher Prairie first came to Washington. Its implicit assumption, that a series of economic patches will add up, eventually, to a piece of whole social cloth, saves the trouble of questioning the serviceability of basic institutions and of devising means for transforming them.

Furthermore, the patchwork school of social science and history to which Keynes belongs makes foolish demands upon science itself. Such a science must have heroes with a demonstrated capacity to grapple with emergencies if the validity of the thesis is to be maintained. At the moment, Keynes serves this exemplary function while Lekachman serves the thesis. This is why we do not have a definitive appraisal of Keynes, but receive in its stead the rhetoric of apocryphy with which some scientists dress their idols.

It is certainly fair to term this "the age of Keynes." But it has not been an age of triumph; nor are we yet done with the more sorry consequences of Keynes's work. It has been a period of precocious and fanciful nationalism. Its most famous lions have been members of the new administrative classes that seek to reconstruct the world in their own image. Our administrators have needed a rationale to justify and guide their handiwork so as to maintain the essential conditions for their own progress, and in answering to this need Keynes found his career. His life and work reveal the disappointments, the seeming victories, and the defeats for all of us that the dubious spirit of our age, the lack of wisdom of our governors, and the shortsightedness of our economists impose upon us now.

A Gallery of Monsters

NORMAN'S LETTER. *By Gavin Lambert. Coward-McCann. 232 pp. $5.50.*

JOHN RECHY
Mr. Rechy, author of City of Night *(Grove Press), has just completed a new novel entitled* Numbers.

In *The Slide Area,* an earlier novel by Gavin Lambert, someone draws a moral from a disastrous landslide that has swept some property away near Malibu: One shouldn't live too near the edge of a cliff.

Sir Norman Lightwood, the narrator in Lambert's new novel, has lived for long on the edge of a symbolic cliff and has surrounded himself with those only too eager to shove him over. His life, in fact, is a morbidly funny dying — an elaborately comic preparation for violence. With compassion never obviated by the deep laughter evoked, Lambert lets Sir Norman tell his own story, in the form of a lengthy letter (spanning 1936-43). Destined never to be sent — and, even if sent, never to be received — it is written to Ahmin, an Arab boy with whom Sir Norman had a furtive sexual encounter in Marrakech. The result is pitch-black comedy.

A wealthy baronet, Sir Norman chooses the Arab boy to write to because he's the only person who hasn't taken him; has, instead, given him something: a memory to cherish. All the others have seized advantage of Sir Norman's weaknesses: the sister who threatens him physically; the singer who marries him only to blackmail him; the woman photographer who may or may not have cunningly "lent" her male-model husband to him; the Santa Fe artist who cons him into commissioning her to do an outrageous mural in a fantastic tower Sir Norman has built à la Hearst in New Mexico; the sometimes sinister, sometimes wise, always crafty guru (most recently "from California") who will probably "inherit" the tower; and finally — and most chilling of all — the mother who leads Norman to a violent encounter with a sinister derelict in Vera Cruz.

But all this is accomplished not without Norman's help. Often a fool, Norman searches out his own violent destiny, crucially and significantly attracted (except in the case of Ahmin, and even with him who knows?) to those who will use him. Not the easiest ingredients for comedy.

Yet Lambert renders all this with just the right degree of exaggeration. Thus Norman's alter ego is Oum Salem, an Egyptian poetess invented by Norman, thereby himself achieving a certain literary success as her "translator" (and posing in drag for the back jacket of "Oum's" book of poems).

Lambert's portraits are subtle commentaries within themselves: In the dawn of a new, strangely inverted time, it is the woman who is the photographer and her husband who is the underclothes model; inevitably, then, it is the "other man," not the "other woman," who can threaten the marriage — through the husband.

In less artful hands, the portrait of Norman's sister — a Fascist — might have been patently offensive. By making her also a strutting, leather-bedecked,

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femme-chasing bull-Lesbian, Lambert, in a few expert strokes, turns her into a parody of Nazism. Now felicitously we can laugh at supermen who are really women in men's uniforms.

Lambert's outstanding achievement in his gallery of monsters is his depiction of the most vampirical of them all: Norman's incredible mother (Lady Dorothea, known as Lady D.), who tried to make him when he was a very young man. (In an outrageous understatement, she describes herself as "only a woman, a widow and a mother.")

After Norman's disastrous marriage has ended in sensational headlines, Lady D. proposes that he spend his time traveling with her. The thought of her sweeping across the world in technicolor while he trails obediently behind her in black and white upsets Norman so much that he passes out. But Lady D. can wait — and wait she does: until weakened by his life among the invited predators, and after a breakdown followed by a period in a sanitarium, Norman can be snatched away by her like carrion by a vulture.

Smothered in black mourning veils, in a somber moment in which Lady D. is brilliantly transformed into Lady Death and Lady Destiny, she leads Norman away to Mexico: "How can I convince my son that I'm no ordinary mother except by taking his hand, leading him like a horse to water and begging him, on my knees if necessary, to drink?" The previously underplayed note of sorrow takes over. Lady D. is leading her son to his inevitable ritual sacrifice. And so, Mom has won. Her surrogate seduction of Norman is terrifyingly complete. Lambert supplies a postscript by Lady D. (which unfortunately, however, erases some of the spooky effect of the last time we saw her through Norman's eyes); and now we see reality in multiple reflections as in mirrors facing each other. Did Norman tell the truth? Did Lady D.? Did either of them? At the end, Lambert lets us choose our own "truth."

Laughing at the Story of O

STORY OF O. *By Pauline Réage. Translated from the French by Sabine d'Estree. Preface by Jean Paulhan of the Académie Française. A note on the* Story of O *by André Pieyre de Mandiargues. Grove Press. 199 pp. $6.*

ALEXANDER LAING

Mr. Laing is professor of Belles-Lettres at Dartmouth College. His poetry has been published in The Nation, The New Yorker, The Atlantic Monthly *and other periodicals. He is the author of* The Cadaver of Gideon Wyck *(Collier), the literary hoax referred to in his review.*

Fourteen years ago, in *Les Temps Modernes,* Simone de Beauvoir published an essay uncommonly lugubrious even for her: "*Faut-il-brûler Sade?* . . . his books take a grip upon us as soon as we see that throughout their rigmaroles, clichés, clumsiness, they try to tell us of an experience which has the odd quality of refusing to be communicated." From this early statement, which reads like a conclusion, she struggled onward through 63 pages of Sartre's *revue mensuelle* to put her existentialist blessing upon the previously all-male effort, begun by Apollinaire, to refurbish the diligent 18th-century advocate of heterosexual buggery.

Two years later a publisher of Sade issued *Histoire d'O,* by Pauline Réage, a novel of today upon the Marquis' favorite theme. *Combat's* reviewer was cautious in his reference: "if there is a Pauline Réage." The use of a feminine pen name perhaps was encouraged by Beauvoir's recent essay, but the book's style has little resemblance to Beauvoir's except in its inordinate solemnity. *Combat* placed it with "the great classics of French eroticism," and here a distinction is in order. The word "erotic," throughout most of its own history, has defined the happy fulfillment of physical love, over which a gentle if capricious god hovers in approval. True erotic love never occurs in *Histoire d'O.* Its theme, explicit sadism, is not brutal either. Man shares many qualities with the brutes, but he alone devises the crueler corruptions of natural impulse with which this book concerns itself, and from which the maligned god Eros would flap off in dismay.

The protagonist, a dull-witted young Parisian fashion photographer, is given no name but "O" which evidently stands for orifice. Her story details the means, psychological and mechanical, by which a docile human being is reduced to a thing, a mere orifice. The main setting is the standard mansion of gothic nightmare, equipped with Sade's routine gadgets: masks, whips, collars, chains, corsets, branding irons. The literary trick, by contrast, is the use of a style of bogus loftiness to describe aberrant sexual outrages. There is none of Sade's forthright phrasing, nor of his occasional rowdy humor. The vocabulary is as circumspect as Fanny Hill's.

The first French critics were anxious not to be caught out. What if the author of this evidently pseudonymous story were a concealed academician? Why had Jean Paulhan, overdue at the time for elevation to the *Académie,* sponsored *O?* Had he invented her himself? Hence the mixture of evasion and absurd praise. *Critique* placed Pauline Réage "among the two or three true novelists of today." When an American translation appeared last March — the French secret having been kept for twelve years — the early reviewers were similarly ambivalent. One, of the sort who can perceive a Christ symbol in any literary patsy, sanctified O as a Christian martyr.

Judging only by internal evidence, I think the book is a spoof of its own genre. For one thing, how could so many critics have passed over the deliberate fun-poking in Paulhan's preface? With a tenuous reference to O's submissiveness in the process of dehumanization, he speculates upon a notebook recording the grievances of some freed West Indian slaves who petitioned for re-enslavement. This missing document of 1838 "has never been recovered," yet Paulhan discusses the significance of its contents with increasing assurance. He concludes that the compiler of a notebook he never has seen "was not telling the truth," and then proclaims what the truth really was. Paulhan either is warning the reader of more leg pulling to follow, or has forfeited his claim to credence. I credit him with the former.

It could be argued that *Story of O* is the vengeful fantasy of a neglected maiden lady, but a clearer case could be made for a Lesbian author, since the only scenes that even approach erotic tenderness are those between women. The men of the story all follow Sade's reiterated doctrine: that pleasure is the highest good, that the infliction of cruelty makes pleasure most exquisite, and that society should be disorganized so as to put no hindrance upon the right of the strong to enjoy inflicting the greatest torture upon the weak. In *Les 120 Journées de Sodome,* Sade pushed his theory to its ultimate inference in multiple orgiastic murders. *Story of O* is more circumspect. The deluded purchaser who does not scan the last page first will find that a final chapter "has been suppressed" (he is not told why or by whom) in which O is abandoned by her possessor in the gothic mansion of horrors. "There exists a second ending" in which O prefers death to abandonment. "Sir Stephen gave her his consent." Here again transparent spoofing replaces the ugly task of facing a resolution of the issue that has centrally been raised.

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Despite *Carrefour's* statement that "the style is of an astonishing purity," many passages bespeak an unskilled author, but others are so crafty as to make these lapses emerge as the deliberate choices of a masquerader, contrived to mislead. Having been guilty in my wayward youth of a similarly solemn hoax (a spoof of the detective story, connecting demonology and monstrous births), I recognized in *Story of O* multitudinous symptoms: an incomplete manuscript of uncertain provenance, the plundering of esoteric originals for horrid rituals, the transplanting of antique atmosphere into modern surroundings, the tongue-in-cheek introduction, the well-wrought flaws. For example, *Story of O* begins in the present tense; but after 3 pages we read, "Another version of the same beginning was simpler." We are given it, in the past tense which persists to the end. A helpful editor would have told an amateur author to make up her mind; but the two beginnings, both given, are an arch balancing of the two endings, neither given: a sophisticated trick. The failure of *Story of O* as a serious novel reflects a likelihood that its author, of whatever sex, had no desire to write one. The theme, taken seriously, should clutch us in deepening pity and terror. Why does it not?

The chief artistic deficiency is a failure at once to establish any basis for concern over O herself. She begins as a docile nitwit and ends as a cipher; nothing significant is destroyed. Sade's Justine is an equally static, and equally dull, character; but she is presented with evident mockery all the way. O is neither a tragic nor a satiric creation. Another serious flaw is the absence of any motive, at outset, for the decision of her lover, René, to witness the ferocious abuse of O by other men. A repressed homosexual admiration for the "grizzled athlete" Sir Stephen, to whom René gives her midway in the account, is hinted at too late. This laxity in characterization of both O and René, moreover, is made more obvious by the hilarious treatment of solemn Sir Stephen, a crude caricature of the French popular notion of an imperturbable English milor'. Most of Sade's important characters, such as Dolmancé and Juliette, are valid satiric creations who monotonously recite their creator's serious beliefs; but the story of O is merely a bad joke.

Why bother with it? Because it reminds us of Beauvoir's question: must we burn Sade? Because, since its appearance in translation, a publisher has lost his final appeal against a stiff jail sentence upon an obscenity conviction? Because the American Civil Liberties Union's steady urging that there is no legal proof of a connection between sadistic books and sadistic crime has just been explicitly refuted by the Pennine Moors murder case?

If the proper study of mankind still is man, of course we must not burn Sade. A view of human nature that ignored the evidence of Sade permitted Nazism almost to inherit the earth. The record of aberrant man's desires and behavior must be kept available, and not merely to the well-to-do. Protection of our freedom to learn the worst about our species includes a defense of the right to read any book, even if it should turn out to be nothing but a bad joke.

THEATRE / Harold Clurman

It has been bruited about that I am nostalgic for the 1930s. This is libel: it is the 1830s whose memory I cherish, and even earlier epochs. Witness my fondness for the ballet.

Thus I welcome the City Center Joffrey Ballet in its first regular New York season on West 55th Street. After Balanchine's heavy guns one is exhilarated anew by the light artillery of Joffrey's youngsters. Balanchine has achieved mastery; the City Center juniors are on the exciting path toward that estate. They shine with mounting energy and the results of excellent training under their artistic director Robert Joffrey and their chief choreographer Gerald Arpino.

It is natural and proper to become enthusiastic over the emergence of such a group. "Capitalist competition" among the arts — abundance of production — is beneficial to creativity. (What the theatre needs is more bad plays to open the way for good ones!) But excessive praise is dangerous. It not only warps judgment but leads to later bitterness in those who give it as well as those who receive. Rave notices are good for business; they cripple appreciation.

Apart from its buoyancy, what immediately struck me about the new ballet company is the attractiveness of many of its individual dancers. Thus far I have not been bowled over by any single item of their repertory. *Viva Vivaldi!* is thoroughly pleasant; *Olympics* shows the handsome male contingent to great advantage. *Cakewalk* is an amiable frolic. *Sea Shadow* has a more than serviceable score by Michael Colgrass and two radiant dancers: the incredibly sylphlike Lisa Bradley and the finely wrought Richard Gain.

Among the novelties Lisa Bradley again excels. She is an ineffable creature of the deep in the earlier ballet, a predatory bird in *Nightwings,* and exquisite in both. But *Nightwings* as a whole is not particularly fresh. Nor was I much moved by Eugene Loring's symbolic *These Three,* which despite its topical subject matter — race riots and the heroics of the civil rights movement — possesses little specific impact or abstract grandeur. There is, however, one effective passage in which the three central male figures dance in concord, a motif repeated at the end by four men who resume the struggle of the martyred three. Loring's intention is bolder than what we actually see, which is surprising in view of the kinetic power inherent in his theme and the gift for incisive visualization he exemplified in *Billy the Kid.*

Moncayo 1, named after its composer, is easy to take, but neither fish nor fowl. The score did not seem to me, though it

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did to others, much more than routine Mexicana. But evaluations of ballet music must be modified by an awareness that the conditions of orchestral rehearsals are seldom what they ought to be.

The best compliment I can offer the new company at this moment is to say that after visiting it for three evenings I am eager to return for more, not only to reconsider the works I've mentioned and another première *(Vitalitas)* but to deepen the pleasure of seeing my favorite dancers again. These include, besides those previously cited, Luis Fuente, who glows with pride of vigor; Robert Blankshine, a sprite who makes one think of both Puck and Huck Finn; Margo Sappinton, whose womanly magnetism lends a special warmth to the third strophe of the Vivaldi number; Barbara Remington, whose elegant posture bespeaks breeding while her eyes twinkle cool wit. Finally, there is Ivy Clear, demurely funny in the light-minded mockery of *Cakewalk*. But I should not say "finally" for further acquaintance with this most engaging company will extend the list of discoveries.

The organization that goes under the name of Theater 1967 and is really the partnership of Richard Barr, Clinton Wilder and Edward Albee at the Cherry Lane Theater has begun a festival season consisting of "elderly" American plays and some new off-beat ones. Each presentation will be limited to a four-week run. The first is three one-act plays by Thornton Wilder.

I was disappointed at the announcement of these plays because two of them are frequently done at community and university theatres. (The last time I saw the best of the three, *The Happy Journey to Trenton and Camden,* was at a performance in Tel Aviv by students of the English Department from the University of Jerusalem.) Therefore, I was agreeably surprised to find that for all their fragility the three plays held my attention. To begin with, they were in every respect ably staged: direction by Michael Kahn, scenery by Ed Wittstein, nice acting by Paula Trueman in *The Happy Journey,* by John Beal, particularly in *Queens of France,* by Bette Henritze and Guinevare Breeding in two of the three.

Two particular aspects in these short plays stimulated me to speculation. First, I always wonder when I see them (as I do at *Our Town* for which *The Happy Journey* is a sort of preliminary sketch) whether they truly reflect lower-middle-class American life before the First World War, or whether they simply represent the myth of that period. Were the times actually so unremittingly affable or is it just Wilder?

If the question is valid at all, I suppose one must answer that what Dreiser and his like saw and what Wilder reminisces about are both, though not equally, true. After all O'Neill wrote *Ah! Wilderness,* a sentimental *aubade,* as well as *Beyond the Horizon* which is all heartbreak. But there is hardly any pain at all in Wilder's *The Long Christmas Dinner,* the first of the three plays on the bill, even though it traces the life cycle of a family through several generations from flowering seed to dusty decay. Mark Twain's masterpieces grin and guffaw but there is bite, even cruelty, in them as well.

These plays (*Queens of France* is just a joke) were written in the early thirties, and the thirties were marked not only by bruises and battle cries but by a supply of healing unguents and mollifying plasters such as the Wilder plays. Then too the thirties was a time when writers sought solace by grazing in rural pastures.

An even more peculiar aspect of Wilder's plays is their endearing banality. Their content — and "content" seems almost too ponderous a word for it — is sheer platitude. Yet they offend no one, beguile many. The secret of their charm lies in an artistry that suggests more than it says. Details are scrupulously chosen but never insisted upon. There is a wily discretion in the plays; they are good natured without gush. Wilder wins by a tender tactfulness. He abates his seduction before you get a chance to cry "uncle!"

I have been absent from these pages since May, but not from the theatre. Besides a stay in Israel (where American, English and French plays thrive at the expense, so they say, of native playwrights), I saw both new and old plays in London. I refrained from reporting on these because they will certainly occupy a major place on Broadway stages during the coming season.

On my return I saw another British product that merited notice: Arnold Wesker's *The Kitchen.* I withheld discussion of this not only because it had become successful without my aid (!) but because I was due to supervise a seminar for new playwrights at Lenox, Mass.

I refer to *The Kitchen* now — it is scheduled to close on October 9 — because I was recently told an interesting fact about it. It attracted a large audience from the neighborhood — Broadway and 81st Street — where it is housed in a recently opened theatre. The vicinity is not usually associated with intellectual life or with the *avant-garde,* though it is sometimes wickedly referred to by its residents as "Needle Park." Still they flocked to see the play (its title refers to the kitchen of a popular restaurant where all the action takes place) because the occasion was worthy, the play's material and milieu compatible with its audience, the prices reasonable. I have always maintained that our best hope for the future lies in the "regional" theatre even within the confines of Manhattan.

YOUNG MAN

He rushed to meet me
falling sidewise at the stairs
my red bell-boy
as I checked in
at the desperate hour.
His need booms in my chest
a cannon ball
where in a Waldorf
of swapped wives
I wait cow-eyed
as he beats it
with my bags.

CAROLYN STOLOFF

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Crossword Puzzle No. 1169

FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS:

1 Your kisser might be affected by a hang-over here! (7, 5)
9 and 20 down Implying a wolf's behavior might be comparatively smooth. (2, 5, 2, 1, 7)
10 Flag, often blue or green on a white background. (4)
11 Probably listed, and therefore possibly docked! (8)
12 The country sounds capable of making things 9 and 20. (6)
13 Wintered between this, when single? (5)
15 Fat in front of the stove? (8)
16 In certain stones it imparts regular motion. (8)
19 The direction a vessel goes is more with the current. (5)
21 A not as bad number? (6)
22 As a merchandiser, one might be useful after something has been 11. (8)
24 Are such utterances extremely native to North America? (4)
25 If there were no right in such commerce there would be no will. (10)
26 Might one consider them almost tractors? (Helps temper a violent outburst, too!) (12)

DOWN:

2 Implying those considered traditionally deaf can hear well enough for eaves-dropping? (9, 5)
3 Confident one might be able to get in later? (7)
4 Forty letters might seem equivalent, or even be superior. (5)
5 Evidently the small business establishment has been built to last a long time. (5, 2)
6 It could be the nag outran another beast! (9)
7 Belonging to both sexes. (7)
8 O, this might reach a lot of people! (8, 6)
14 Those who like the system in the service might adhere to it. (9)
17 What are usually described as running down, go differently with rips. (5, 2)
18 A minor injury implies no handicap! (7)
20 See 9 across
23 Short for 25, when untainted. (5)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1168

ACROSS: 1 Boston massacre; 9 Enlists; 11 Detracts; 12 Swoops; 14 and 23 Digital computer; 15 and 10 Spear-carrier; 17 Eight; 19 Newness; 21 Braise; 25 Laid out; 26 Iterate; 27 Prime ministers. DOWN: 1 Breadline; 2 Saluted; 3 Onslaught; 4 Misstating; 5 Sock; 6 Arrow; 7 Rhizome; 8 Arms; 13 Slow-motion; 15 Sleepless; 16 Riderless; 18 Glacier; 20 Situate; 21 Ball; 22 Storm; 24 Stem.

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